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There is a long history of disagreement about what the mens rea for
complicity is. Some courts take it to be the intention for the underlying
crime to succeed while others take mere knowledge of the underlying
crime to be sufficient. Still others propose that the mens rea for
complicity tracks the mens rea of the underlying crime—the so-called
“derivative approach.” However, as argued herein, these familiar
approaches face difficulties. Accordingly, we have reason to continue
our search for the elusive mens rea for complicity. This Article
develops a new account of the mens rea for complicity, drawing on an
older approach informed by agency law principles. In particular, I
argue that a distinct attitude of condoning the underlying crime is best
seen as the mens rea for complicity. This approach yields a more
principled framework for determining when accomplice liability is
warranted than the existing approaches do. Moreover, it demonstrates
that certain reforms to the current legal regime are warranted. Most
importantly, the law should recognize that complicity comes in degrees.
While reforms of this sort have been previously proposed for reasons
relating to causation, this Article argues that different levels of
complicity must also be recognized on independent mens rea grounds.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the federal aiding and abetting statute, “[w]hoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”1
There is widespread agreement that to be guilty under this provision,
one must not only perform an action in aid of the conduct of the
principal wrongdoer, but also perform that action with some mens rea
(or mental state) toward the principal’s underlying crime.2 However,
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).
2. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2, at 337 (2d ed. 2003) (“It
may generally be said that one is liable as an accomplice to the crime of another if he (a) gave
assistance or encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to prevent it (b) with the intent
thereby to promote or facilitate commission of the crime.”); see also Rosemond v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 (2014) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994)) (“[T]hose who provide knowing aid to persons
committing federal crimes, with the intent to facilitate the crime, are themselves committing a
crime.”). Although the word “intent” is used by these authorities in stating the general rule for
complicity, this should not be taken to settle the debate about what mens rea toward the
underlying crime is required for being an accomplice. It is not entirely clear what “intent” as
used by these authorities means—in particular, whether this “intent” standard can ever be
satisfied by something less than full intention or purpose, such as mere knowledge or even
recklessness. See Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and
Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1351–52 (2002); see
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there is a long history of disagreement about how, precisely, this mens
rea should be understood.3 As one commentator recently observed, “the
law on the aider and abettor’s mental state is . . . best described today as
in a state of chaos.”4 Some courts have held that what is required for
complicity is that aid be rendered with the intention or purpose for the
underlying crime to succeed.5 Others have held that it is enough to aid
the principal’s conduct while merely having knowledge that the crime
will be committed.6 Yet others have taken an altogether different view,
proposing that the mens rea required for complicity tracks the mens rea
of the underlying crime—the so-called “derivative approach.”7
However, as argued below, these familiar approaches face
difficulties.8 It will become clear that one of the major challenges for
the existing approaches is that they allow a defendant to be convicted as
an accomplice, and therefore punished “as a principal,”9 even when the
accomplice appears to be substantially less culpable than the principal
wrongdoer.
Accordingly, we have reason to continue our search for the elusive
mens rea for complicity. This Article develops a new account of the
mens rea for complicity, drawing on an older approach informed by
agency law principles. Commentators often give the agency theory
short shrift, but it has advantages and accordingly deserves careful
scrutiny. Although I argue that the agency theory ultimately faces
problems as traditionally formulated, recognizing the problems points
the way to a better account. The account I end up proposing adopts the
also infra note 6 and accompanying text.
3. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 337 (“There is a split of authority as to whether some lesser
mental state will suffice for accomplice liability, such as mere knowledge that one is aiding a
crime or knowledge that one is aiding reckless or negligent conduct which may produce a
criminal result.”).
4. Weiss, supra note 2, at 1351.
5. Most importantly, intention or purpose is suggested by Judge Learned Hand’s seminal
opinion on complicity, which held that being an accomplice requires that the defendant “in some
sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to
bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.” United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,
402 (2d Cir. 1938). This formulation was then quoted approvingly by the Supreme Court in Nye
& Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949).
6. The Supreme Court recently noted that with respect to what it termed the “intent” required
for being an accomplice, it had “previously found that intent requirement satisfied when a person
actively participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting
the charged offense.” Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1248–49 (emphasis added)); see also Weiss,
supra note 2, at 1396–409 (discussing cases requiring only knowledge).
7. See Weiss, supra note 2, at 1410–14 (discussing the derivative approach); see also infra
notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Parts II–III.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).
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basic insight of the agency theory, but refines it in a number of respects
and thereby seeks to place the law of complicity on a firmer normative
foundation.
According to the account defended here, a distinct attitude of
condoning the underlying crime is what should be regarded as the mens
rea for complicity. A key feature of this account, which goes beyond
the agency theory as traditionally formulated, is that one can condone
the underlying crime to greater or lesser degrees. This, in turn, helps
explain why accomplices sometimes can be less culpable than the
principals they aid. As argued below, this feature of the theory helps it
circumvent the problems that undermine existing accounts of the mens
rea for complicity.
The upshot of the account defended here is that the law of complicity
stands in need of reform. In particular, the law should begin to
distinguish between full and lesser complicity. In the current legal
regime, those who are found guilty as accomplices are punished as
principals—i.e., subject to the same panoply of sentencing options as
the primary wrongdoer. Under the reform advocated here, however,
only full accomplices should be punished as principals, while lesser
accomplices should be subject to less harsh sentences. Reforms of this
sort are needed, I argue, in order to capture the fact that accomplices are
not always as culpable as the principals they aid, and to avoid the
resulting injustice involved in punishing every accomplice as a
principal.
A number of prominent legal scholars have advocated reforms that
are similar in spirit, but their arguments have tended to focus on issues
of causation, not considerations pertaining to mens rea. For example,
Joshua Dressler has argued that complicity law is a “disgrace” because
“[i]t treats the accomplice in terms of guilt and potential punishment as
if she were the perpetrator, even when her culpability may be less than
that of the perpetrator . . . and/or her involvement in the crime is
tangential.”10 Accordingly, Dressler proposes reforming the law of
complicity so that “[a] person is not accountable for the actions of the
perpetrator unless her assistance not only satisfies the [but-for]
causation requirement but there is evidence that the accomplice was a
substantial participant, not a bit player, in the multi-party crime.”11 In
a similar vein, Baruch Weiss has argued that “in cases involving
knowledge offenses, where the aider and abettor acts with mere
10. Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance As A Lesser Offense?, 5
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 428–29 (2008) (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
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knowledge . . . [liability should be confined] to cases where the aider
and abettor has rendered not just any act of assistance, but rather one
that is substantial.”12 That is, he thinks we should “increas[e] the
substantiality of the requisite act [of aid or facilitation] when [this is]
necessary to protect a marginal participant.”13 Similarly, Michael
Moore contends that accomplices “should be held to the completed
crime only if . . . they either substantially caused the criminal result, or
that result counterfactually depended upon their action,”14 while
Christopher Kutz argues that “[a] rational law of complicity would
recognize [the differing culpability levels of participants in criminal
activities], by mitigating the accountability of [minimal] accomplices
and aggravating that of instigators.”15
I am sympathetic to such arguments and the reform proposals they
support. Nonetheless, these authors have not recognized the full force
of the case for reforming the law of complicity. These scholars argue
that because accomplices can causally contribute to the underlying
crime to greater or lesser degrees, and because this in turn might bear on
their culpability, special rules are needed to protect accomplices that
contribute to the crime in only minor ways. 16 (Indeed, the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines already contain a provision that speaks to these
causation-related concerns.17) However, one of the chief conclusions of
this Article is that the law of complicity requires reform not just for
causation reasons, but also for independent mens rea reasons. In
particular, I argue that the mens rea for complicity, if it is to be
understood in a normatively defensible way, must itself be seen as
coming in degrees. Accordingly, a normatively adequate understanding
of the mens rea of complicity provides a separate basis for recognizing
that accomplices can be less culpable than the principals they aid, and
therefore should not automatically be punished as principals. This
Article’s investigation of the mens rea for complicity thus provides an
additional ground—beyond mere considerations of causation—for the
conclusion that complicity doctrine should be reformed to recognize
different levels of complicity.

12. Weiss, supra note 2, at 1487 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 1488.
14. Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 395, 451–52 (2007) (emphasis added).
15. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 233 (2000)
(footnote omitted).
16. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011); see
also infra note 129 and accompanying text.
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I intend to back into the conclusion that complicity law requires
reform—specifically, that it should distinguish between full and lesser
complicity—by going back to first principles and re-examining what
mens rea should be required for complicity. After offering a few
preliminary clarifications in Part I, Part II critiques the most prominent
contemporary accounts of the mens rea for complicity. Specifically, I
consider two familiar single mens rea approaches, as well as the
criticisms of them offered by Gideon Yaffe. I then raise doubts about
Yaffe’s own account and proceed to argue against the derivative
approach favored by some courts. Part III then investigates, but
ultimately rejects, an older account of the mens rea for complicity that is
based on agency law principles. Understanding the shortcomings of the
agency law approach, however, points the way to a better theory, which
I articulate and defend in the last two Parts of the Article. Part IV
formulates a new account of the mens rea for complicity based on the
core notion of condoning a crime. This account, I suggest, helps shed
light on the hitherto intractable debate over the correct mens rea
standard for complicity. Finally, Part V investigates how to practically
implement the resulting view of complicity. The upshot is a more
principled and flexible framework for determining when accomplice
liability is warranted, one which more adequately explains and justifies
criminal accomplice liability than the existing accounts. Having
reached a more normatively defensible account of the mens rea for
complicity, it thus becomes clear just how badly the law of complicity
stands in need of reform.
I. PRELIMINARIES
A. Complicity Law Generally
To begin with, I should note a few basic points about the law of
complicity that will serve as background for the discussion to follow.
Accomplice liability is generally thought to be derivative in nature.18
That is, the liability of the accomplice is thought to be parasitic on the
liability of the principal wrongdoer. Accordingly, under existing law,
accomplices are traditionally punished as principals.19 That is, they are
convicted of the principal’s underlying crime and thus are subject to the
18. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation
of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985) (“The secondary party’s liability is derivative,
which is to say, it is incurred by virtue of a violation of law by the primary party to which the
secondary party contributed.” (footnote omitted)).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”).
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same panoply of sentencing options as the principal20 (even if judges
have discretion to tailor sentences as the facts of the case may
warrant21).
Next, being an accomplice requires some act that aids or facilitates
the underlying crime. My aim here is not to give an account of what
this act requirement involves, as that is a complex question in its own
right. But note that the act must be deliberate—i.e., it cannot merely be
an accidental or involuntary body movement that happens to benefit the
principal.22 As Wayne LaFave notes, “[s]everal terms have been
employed by courts and legislatures in describing the kinds of acts
which will suffice for accomplice liability. The most common are ‘aid,’
‘abet,’ ‘advise,’ ‘assist,’ ‘cause,’ ‘command,’ ‘counsel,’ ‘encourage,’
‘hire,’ ‘induce,’ and ‘procure.’”23 Moreover, an extremely minimal act
can suffice.24 As one case discussed by LaFave puts it, “[t]he assistance
given . . . need not contribute to the criminal result in the sense that but
for it the [criminal] result would not have ensued.”25
In addition, some mens rea or mental state directed toward the
principal’s underlying crime is also required for being an accomplice—
whether the required mens rea is taken to be purpose, knowledge, or
something else.26 This Article will consider a number of views as to
what, precisely, the required mens rea is.

20. Weiss, supra note 2, at 1345 (“The aider and abettor is guilty not of some lesser offense,
but of the very offense committed by the actual perpetrator . . . . Thus, our taxi driver, if she is an
aider and abettor, is guilty of bank robbery and subject to the same potential penalties as the
actual bank robber who went into the bank, threatened the teller, and grabbed the money.”).
21. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (observing that since United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), “the [Sentencing] Guidelines are now advisory, and appellate
review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are ‘reasonable’”).
22. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1)–(2) (1985) (noting that “[a] person is not guilty
of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission
to perform an act of which he is physically capable,” and specifying, for example, that neither “a
reflex or convulsion” nor “a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or
determination of the actor” is a voluntary act).
23. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 13.2, at 337-38.
24. For example, in one case discussed by Glanville Williams, accomplice liability was
imposed on a bystander to an assault who merely shouted “[l]et him have it, Chris!” during a
brawl. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 126, at 382 n.2 (2d ed.
1961). For a more recent example, see United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505, 507–08 (7th Cir.
1995), where an aiding and abetting conviction was affirmed for a defendant who knowingly
“assisted the sale by pointing to the bag of heroin,” and said “over there.” See generally JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.04(B)(1), at 508 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that
“the degree of aid or influence provided is immaterial”).
25. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 13.2, at 342 (quoting State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722,
738 (Ala. 1894)).
26. See supra note 2.
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B. Two Clarifications
The discussion to follow will be limited in two respects. First, I shall
focus just on the question of what makes accomplice liability
appropriate or deserved, not the broader question of whether it is
justified, e.g., by consequentialist considerations.
To say that
conviction of a certain crime, C, is deserved is just to say that the
defendant possesses the required type and degree of culpability that is
characteristic of the wrongdoing in cases of C. 27 By contrast, there may
be extraneous considerations—such as facts about deterrence—that in
principle could make it justified to expand the definition of C to permit
conviction even when one does not strictly speaking deserve it.28 29
Since I am here concerned with when accomplice liability is
deserved, I will be focusing primarily on retributivist considerations,
and will not ask how the conclusions of this Article are affected by
consequentialist considerations (which many take to be crucial to the
justification of punishment).30 Therefore, the arguments of this Article
should be understood to be conditional on there being no serious
problems from the consequentialist perspective (which there, of course,
might turn out to be).
Second, since my focus here is the mens rea for complicity, I
endeavor as far as possible to set aside the question of how much and
what type of causal impact on the underlying crime (if any) is required
for accomplice liability. Some have forcefully argued that it is unfair to
treat those who make only a very small contribution to the underlying
crime as accomplices, who are punishable as principals. For instance,
Dressler has argued that one should not be “accountable for the actions
of the perpetrator unless her assistance not only satisfies the [but-for]
causation requirement but there is evidence that the accomplice was a

27. If C is a malum prohibitum crime (i.e., criminal not because wrong in itself, but because
prohibited), then there may be no wrongdoing inherent in C. But that is no problem, since it
simply means that conviction of C would never be properly deserved, even though it might be
justified by other deterrence or consequentialist considerations.
28. Of course, such a view would be controversial, as it would transgress the familiar “desert
constraint” on punishment. See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 141, 150 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012)
(observing that consequentialist justifications of punishment are often criticized as permitting
“the practice of punishing persons known . . . to be innocent when doing so would achieve net
social benefits,” thus violating the desert constraint on punishment).
29. Note also that in theory, there could also be consequentialist considerations that make it
justified to refrain from convicting some defendants even though they might deserve it.
30. See Berman, supra note 28, at 144–46 (discussing considerations like deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, which commonly figure into consequentialist justifications of
punishment).
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substantial participant, not a bit player, in the multi-party crime.”31
Weiss,32 Moore,33 and Kutz34 have made similar suggestions.
I am sympathetic to the idea of treating putative accomplices
differently depending on the degree of causal contribution they have
made to the underlying crime (insofar as this might bear on an
accomplice’s culpability). However, the question of what kind of
causal contribution one must make to the underlying crime in order for
accomplice liability to be warranted raises a host of thorny questions in
its own right,35 and since my topic here is only the mens rea required for
complicity, I will largely steer clear of such causation issues in what
follows. In particular, to avoid causation-related complications, I try to
avoid examples in which a putative accomplice intuitively should not be
convicted as an aider and abettor because he made only a small causal
contribution to (was a minor participant in) the primary wrongdoer’s
crime. It is precarious to draw general inferences about whether the
defendants in such cases possess the level of culpability or type of mens
rea required for complicity. After all, if such defendants seem to have
only slight culpability, this might well be due to the small causal
contribution they make to the underlying crime. Accordingly, the
various accounts of the mens rea for complicity to be discussed below
should be tested mainly against cases in which a meaningful
contribution is made to the underlying crime, such that our intuitions are
not misled by the complications involving accomplices who contribute
only trivially or insignificantly to the underlying crime.36

31. Dressler, supra note 10, at 447.
32. Weiss, supra note 2, at 1487–88.
33. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
35. For example, is accomplice liability fairly imposed on someone who endorsed the
underlying crime but failed to make its success any more likely? Should such a person be treated
as a principal, or is some lesser degree of accomplice liability warranted instead? Does one’s
actual causal contribution bear on one’s culpability and warranted punishment even when the
actual amount of aid rendered was much greater than expected or intended (a kind of moral luck)?
Or does one’s culpability depend only on the degree of causal contribution that was foreseeable at
the time one acted in aid of the crime?
36. Another important clarification—perhaps obvious to legal practitioners—is this: in order
to have the required mens rea (whatever it is) toward the underlying crime, one need not possess
this mens rea toward that crime under the description “crime,” “criminal,” “wrong,” or the like.
It is intuitive that one can be an accomplice to murder, for example, if one merely aids the
principal’s conduct with the purpose of bringing about the victim’s death, even if one does not act
with an intention the content of which is “I will help him commit murder.” Rather, to be an
accomplice to murder, it should suffice that one merely act with an intention (or whatever other
mens rea is required) the content of which is “I will help bring about the victim’s death.” More
generally, in order to have the mens rea, M, toward the underlying crime, C, that is required for
being an accomplice to C, the content of M does not have to be “C,” “crime,” “wrongdoing,” or
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II. PROMINENT CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF THE MENS REA FOR
COMPLICITY
In this Part, I critique the most prominent contemporary accounts of
the mens rea for complicity. I consider two familiar single mens rea
approaches, as well as the criticisms of them offered by Gideon Yaffe. I
then raise doubts about Yaffe’s own account and proceed to argue
against the derivative approach favored by some courts. In the next
Part, I complete the critical portion of the Article by investigating the
older agency law account of the mens rea for complicity.
A. Intent and Knowledge
The simplest approach to identifying the mens rea for complicity is to
take it that, in all cases, the putative accomplice must bear one of the
criminal law’s traditional mental states toward the underlying crime.
Typically, this is either intent (purpose) or knowledge. Yaffe helpfully
explains the difficulties that these approaches face.37
Consider first the view that to be an accomplice, one must have the
intent or purpose of bringing about the principal’s crime.38 As Yaffe
explains, this view is problematic because it sets the bar for accomplice
liability too high. While it is clear that rendering aid with the intent that
the underlying crime be committed is a sufficient basis for accomplice
liability (provided the other requirements are satisfied), taking such
intent to be necessary for complicity erroneously rules out some cases
that intuitively should count. For example, Yaffe points out, “[t]he
getaway car driver who is being paid separately from the proceeds of
the robbery is surely an accomplice to the robbery, even though he does
not seek the occurrence of the crime, or is in any other way committed
anything similar, but could instead be just the relevant elements of C or the conditions in virtue of
which those elements would obtain. This is a point that Gideon Yaffe has convincingly made in
the attempts context. See GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 98–101 (2010) (discussing the conditions under which we may “enrich” the
description of what someone is trying to do). The Supreme Court also recognizes this point. See,
e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1250 (2014) (observing that the mens rea for
complicity can be “satisfied when a person actively participates in a criminal venture with full
knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged offense” (emphasis added)).
37. Gideon Yaffe, Intending to Aid, 33 L. & PHIL. 1, 8–11 (2014).
38. Weiss helpfully distinguishes two versions of the intent approach. One merely requires
that “the aider and abettor purposefully intend and desire that the principal commit the acts that
constitute a violation of the law.” Weiss, supra note 2, at 1393. (This is the version Yaffe
discusses.) The second version requires not only desiring that the principal commit the acts that
constitute the crime, but in addition that he has “a bad purpose—i.e., he or she must understand
that the principal’s conduct violates the law, and desire that the conduct violate the law.” Id. The
latter approach recognizes ignorance of the law as an excuse that exculpates the aider and abettor,
while the former does not.
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to making it more likely that the crime takes place; this is a problem for
the intent position.”39
Taking knowledge40 to be the mens rea required for complicity is
similarly problematic. It sets the bar too low. The reason, Yaffe
suggests, is that according to the knowledge standard, one “who gives
money to the panhandler, knowing [he] will use at least some of it to
buy drugs” is an accomplice, although such a person intuitively “is not
an accomplice to a drug buy.”41
Some might question Yaffe’s argument here. Perhaps this benefactor
seems not to be an accomplice only because real life versions of this
example would involve only recklessness.42 When panhandlers ask for
money, one is rarely certain that the money one gives will be used on
drugs. The more common scenario involves only suspicions that it will.
But supposing one asks the panhandler why he wants the money,
receives the answer “to buy heroin,” and then proceeds to give the
panhandler enough money to buy a dose, then it is not implausible that
one really is complicit in the resulting drug buy. 43
Nonetheless, Yaffe is right to doubt the normative credentials of the
knowledge standard, as can be seen from other examples. Suppose you
give $10 to each of ten panhandlers, and you have conclusive evidence
for thinking that there is a 60% chance each one will use the money to
39. Yaffe, supra note 37, at 10.
40. Note that knowledge that proposition, p, is true, in the criminal law, is typically taken to
mean a subjective belief amounting to practical certainty in p plus the truth of p—not justified
true belief plus an anti-Gettier condition, as in the philosophical literature. See Robin Charlow,
Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1374–75 (1992).
41. Yaffe, supra note 37, at 10.
42. Recklessness, as Ira Robbins notes, is acting with a “conscious disregard of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk, or ‘conscious risk creation.’” Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction:
Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 220–22
(1990) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(c), 2.02 cmt. 3, at 236 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985)).
43. On the other hand, perhaps it seems that the benefactor should not be an accomplice even
if he did have full knowledge because, although concerned not to facilitate any criminal or
harmful behavior, he nonetheless believes there are other justifying reasons to give the
panhandler the money. For example, perhaps the knowing benefactor is motivated by
compassion or a desire to show empathy, which he thinks is a reason that justifies helping the
panhandler buy his heroin. Even if this were to describe the moral state of affairs, the law does
not take this position. The law, that is, does not recognize any such justifying reasons to commit
knowledge crimes—which marks a difference from recklessness crimes. For knowledge crimes,
the only justifying reasons the law recognizes are the affirmative defenses. See Kenneth W.
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 474–75 (1992) (“Once an actor perceives
a ‘highly probable’ risk of physical harm, she is prima facie liable for assault or murder. She
must fit within a limited number of defenses in order to avoid conviction. But an actor who
perceives only a ‘substantial’ risk is not liable unless her conduct both is unjustifiable and is a
‘gross deviation’ from social norms, considering all of the circumstances.”).
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buy heroin.44 Although you are not practically certain (i.e., do not
count as knowing) that any particular panhandler will use your money
to buy drugs, you are practically certain that at least one will. If
knowledge were the mens rea for complicity, you would plausibly be an
accomplice to at least one drug buy (likely several). But this might
seem counterintuitive.
Alternatively, if one is tempted to dismiss the previous example
because it raises questions about the legal import of statistical
evidence,45 notice that problems arise even without statistical evidence.
Suppose a gas station attendant fills up a car knowing that its occupants
are about to rob a bank.46 Suppose this is not trivial aid, but makes the
crime easier because the nearest other gas station is miles away (and
driving there would make apprehension a bit more likely).47 Despite
knowingly aiding the robbery, the attendant seems substantially less
culpable than the robbers themselves.
Accordingly, it seems
problematic to treat him as an accomplice who is punishable as a
principal.
These examples suggest that knowledge is not always sufficient for
having the mens rea for complicity. Nor is it necessary. As Yaffe
notes, it seems complicity “can be present in at least some cases in
which a person thinks it likely, but falls short of fully believing, that the
activity he aids will involve the crime.”48 For example, it seems proper
to count as an accomplice “the getaway car driver [who] thinks there is
a 65% chance his friends will rob the bank while inside and a 35%
chance that they will simply make a legal deposit.”49 Thus, it seems
recklessness should sometimes also satisfy the mens rea requirement for
complicity. We want our view of the mens rea for complicity to make
room for this possibility, too.50
B. Yaffe’s Account
Based on considerations like the foregoing, Yaffe plausibly
44. For a similar example in a different context, see id. at 473–74.
45. See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1 (2012) (analyzing the moral and legal significance of acting with statistical knowledge).
46. This example is drawn from Weiss, supra note 2, at 1487.
47. We also must suppose that the attendant is not threatened, but is free to refuse, since
otherwise he would have an excuse for selling them the gas.
48. Yaffe, supra note 37, at 14.
49. Id. at 10.
50. Kadish also takes the view that recklessness with respect to the underlying crime can
suffice for accomplice liability. See Sanford Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 369, 378–83 (1997) (arguing that in some cases, recklessly aiding the underlying
crime can suffice for accomplice liability).
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concludes that taking the mens rea for complicity to be intent is
underinclusive, while taking it to be knowledge is overinclusive (as well
as underinclusive).51 Accordingly, Yaffe seeks a “middle way,” which
would specify the mens rea for complicity so as to avoid the defects of
both the intent standard and the knowledge standard.52
On Yaffe’s picture, intentions are attitudes that have certain contents,
which can be thought of as a proposition describing the state of affairs
intended.53 Furthermore, Yaffe distinguishes between being committed
by one’s intention to promoting some condition and merely being
committed by one’s intention to the obtaining of the condition.54 Thus,
I might be committed to promoting some of the conditions in the
content of my intention, but not others.
To use Yaffe’s example, suppose a sniper is instructed to assassinate
the second UCLA graduate to speak at a graduation event at the
school.55 Thus, the content of the sniper’s intention is to shoot and kill
the second UCLA graduate to speak.56 Accordingly, (at least) the
following three conditions are present in the content of the sniper’s
intention: 1) the person targeted is the second speaker, 2) the person
targeted is a UCLA graduate, and 3) the person targeted is shot and
dies.57 The sniper, Yaffe observes, is committed to taking steps to
ensuring that 1) and 3) obtains, but not to ensuring that 2) does. 58 After
all, for the sniper nothing is riding on the fact that he kills someone who
happens to be a UCLA graduate. The important thing is that he kills the
second speaker, who also incidentally has the property of being a
UCLA graduate. Thus, Yaffe explains “[t]he sniper is committed by his
intention to the co-occurrence of . . . three properties, but he is
committed by his intention to promoting the occurrence only of” the
first and third.59
What is the upshot of all this? Although the sniper is not committed
to promoting the obtaining of 2), Yaffe thinks there nonetheless is a
weaker sense in which the sniper is committed to 2) being true—and it
is this weaker sense of commitment that Yaffe takes to be the crux of
complicity liability. In particular, because the sniper has the intention

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Yaffe, supra note 37, at 8–11.
Id. at 13.
See, e.g., id. at 19.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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he does—with “UCLA graduate” included in the content of his
intention—the sniper is committed to not abandoning his intention
merely on the ground that the person to be assassinated is indeed a
UCLA graduate. In other words, suppose the sniper walks into the
room with the intention to kill the second UCLA graduate to speak.
Now he is informed by the person next to him that, indeed, the second
speaker graduated from UCLA. It would be irrational, Yaffe thinks, if
the sniper were to give up his plan solely on the basis of learning this
fact. Thus, when a condition is included in the content of one’s
intention, one is at the very least “commit[ed] to not reconsider[ing]
one’s intention on the grounds that one believes the condition to
hold.”60
Thus, Yaffe’s proposal for the mens rea of complicity is this: “D
meets the mens rea standard for complicity with P’s crime C if and only
if D has an intention to aid that constitutes a commitment of nonreconsideration with respect to the commission of C by P.”61 In other
words, if the commission of P’s crime is included in the content of the
intention that D acts with when he aids P, such that D would be
irrational to reconsider that intention just based on the belief that P will
commit the crime, then D has the mens rea required to be an
accomplice.
Yaffe immediately proceeds to clarify that we must distinguish
between considering a condition in your deliberations and that
condition’s figuring into the content of your intention.62 On Yaffe’s
view, the former is not enough for having the mens rea for complicity;
only the latter suffices.63 Consider, say, the person who donates to the
panhandler (“the benefactor”) and merely considers it highly likely (i.e.,
knows) that the panhandler will use some of the money on drugs.
Despite taking this likelihood into account in his deliberations, he

60. Id. at 16.
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 22.
63. Here’s how Yaffe puts this point: He says that different commitments are produced by i)
merely considering a condition in your deliberations, as opposed to ii) having a condition figure
into the content of your intention. He notes
that the first agent, who does not include the panhandler’s crime in the content of his
intention, is under no rational pressure not to reconsider his intention to aid if the
deliberation that issued in that intention was not fully rational. That is, if he was not
under rational pressure to form the intention to aid in the first place, he is not under
rational pressure to retain the intention in the face of facts that he took into
consideration when he formed it but did not include in the content of the resulting
intention.
Id. at 23 (emphasis omitted).

SARCH (131-178).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

10/9/2015 5:14 PM

Condoning the Crime

145

decides to give the panhandler some money nonetheless. However, it
does not follow that this consideration is part of the content of the
benefactor’s intention. And this is the crucial thing for complicity,
Yaffe thinks: It is only when a condition figures into the content of a
person’s intention that he is under rational pressure not to reconsider in
light of the fact that that condition obtains. If the condition merely
figures into the person’s deliberations, this does not generate the same
rational pressure not to reconsider.64
Thus, since the benefactor only considered in his deliberations the
fact that the panhandler might use some of the money for drugs, it
would not be irrational of the benefactor to reconsider upon being told
that the panhandler will use some of the money on drugs. This might
get him to see his deliberations as irrational, for example, thus causing
him to give up his intention to donate. By contrast, if the content of the
benefactor’s intention were to give the panhandler some money that will
be used in part on drugs, then he really would be committed to not
reconsidering upon learning that the panhandler will use part of the
money on drugs. It would be irrational of the benefactor to reconsider
his intention just on this basis. After all, the purpose of intentions,
Yaffe thinks, is to conclude deliberations and settle on a course of
action, and reconsidering based on something that is in the content of
the intention seems pointless, as this would reopen the very question
that the intention was meant to settle (i.e., what to do). Thus, the
benefactor does not count as having the required mens rea for
complicity because the panhandler’s drug purchase does not figure into
the content of the benefactor’s intention.
Accordingly, Yaffe’s view may be summarized as follows:
Yaffe’s Mens Rea for Complicity:
1) If (and only if) the commission of the crime by the principal
is included in the content of the defendant’s intention, i,
when he acts to aid the principal, such that the defendant
would be irrational to reconsider i just based on the belief
that the principal will commit the crime, then the defendant
has the mens rea required to be an accomplice of that crime.
2) If the defendant merely took the principal’s crime into
consideration in the deliberations that issued in i, but the
crime does not figure into the content of i itself, then the
64. More specifically, Yaffe claims, while you would remain barred from reconsidering if you
believe your deliberations were rational, believing your deliberations were not rational allows
you to reconsider based on learning that a condition you considered in those deliberations obtains.
Id. at 23.
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defendant is not under rational pressure not to reconsider i
just based on the fact that the principal will commit the
crime, and so the defendant lacks the mens rea for being an
accomplice to that crime.
One might question Yaffe’s view in various ways. I will raise two
such questions here. Perhaps answers can be found, but I think these
questions make it reasonable to continue our search for the mens rea for
complicity.
First, there is a practical worry about how to implement Yaffe’s view
in the criminal law. In particular, how do we figure out exactly what is
in the content of a person’s intention and what is not? From the outside,
there appears to be a vanishingly small difference between conditions
that one merely considers in deliberating and conditions that are overtly
included in the content of one’s intention when one acts. It may well
prove unworkable to make the imposition of accomplice liability turn
on this distinction. It seems likely that in many real cases it will be
virtually impossible to distinguish cases of the first type from cases of
the second. For example, how are we in practice to tell the difference
between (a) the benefactor who gives money to the panhandler after
merely considering in his deliberations the fact that the money will be
used on drugs from (b) the benefactor who gives the panhandler money
while the content of his intention expressly includes the fact that the
panhandler will use some of the money on drugs? After all, the
benefactor behaves the same way in both cases.
The second worry is normative. In particular, why think there is any
significant difference in culpability between these two versions of the
benefactor that could justify imposing accomplice liability on the
second, but not the first? After all, benefactor (a) is stipulated to have
expressly considered the fact that the money he gives the panhandler
will be used on drugs, and then decided to go ahead and do so anyway.
Although the fact that the money will be used on drugs is part of the
content of the benefactor’s intention in case (b), this is not something
that he has to be committed to promoting. The benefactor in (b) need
not be committed by his intention to taking steps to ensure that the
panhandler completes his drug buy—just as would be the case for the
benefactor in (a). Accordingly, it is difficult to see why there is any
difference in culpability between the two benefactors, which would
make accomplice liability appropriate for one but not the other.
Now, Yaffe is aware of this objection. In response, he argues that
benefactor (b) is worse because he is committed by his intention to not
reconsider it “even if it was irrational to form the intention in the first

SARCH (131-178).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

10/9/2015 5:14 PM

Condoning the Crime

147

place.”65 By contrast, benefactor (a) is not under rational pressure to
refrain from reconsidering his intention. Yaffe explains:
[A] person [like benefactor (b)] who intends to aid a drug buy thereby
gives himself a positive reason not to take the fact of the other’s
commission of the crime as a reason to reconsider the way in which he
directs his conduct. If he really has a reason to reconsider in light of
that fact—if it was irrational for him to form the intention in the first
place perhaps because it is wrong to buy drugs—his commitments
silence those reasons. By contrast, [a] person [like benefactor (a)]
who intends to aid a purchase, and considers the fact that it will be a
purchase of drugs when he forms the intention, has not altered the
landscape of reasons in this way. If he had no good reason to form the
intention, he has no good reason to retain it in the face of the fact that
he will be aiding a drug buy.66

Thus, benefactor (b) seems more committed to aiding the drug buy.
He has given himself a positive reason (put himself under rational
pressure) not to reconsider his intention even if that intention was
irrationally formed. By contrast, benefactor (a) is under no rational
pressure not to reconsider his intention if it was irrationally formed.
Might this explain why benefactor (b) is more culpable than
benefactor (a)? Doubts remain. Yaffe’s claim is just that, supposing
the intention to give money to the panhandler is itself irrational,
benefactor (a) would not be irrational in reconsidering that intention on
the ground that the money will be used for drugs, while benefactor (b)
would be irrational for reconsidering his intention on that ground. But
why think that this added irrationality for benefactor (b) makes a
difference to his culpability—not to mention enough of a difference to
warrant suddenly imposing accomplice liability? Yaffe’s idea, I take it,
is that it is because this added irrationality stems from the greater
commitment that benefactor (b) has to aiding a drug buy.67 But this is
far from obvious. After all, it is often going to be a matter of luck
whether a given condition makes it into the explicit content of one’s
intention or not. In many cases, whether it does might depend on
factors outside one’s control that are not reflective of one’s
culpability—e.g., whether one is pressed for time, or whether one is
distracted or cognitively limited. Therefore, it does not seem that the
question of whether a given condition has made it into the content of
one’s intention will always signal a greater commitment to, or a greater
willingness to tolerate, the criminal aims of the principal—as opposed
65. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
66. Id. at 24–25.
67. Id. at 24.
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to stemming from arbitrary factors beyond one’s control.
As a result, if the difference between benefactors (a) and (b) can
sometimes be due solely to luck, it does not seem that one necessarily is
more culpable just because the principal’s crime has made it into the
express content of one’s intention. Therefore, the question of whether
the principal’s crime is contained in the content of the defendant’s
intention does not seem to mark the kind of deep difference in
culpability that could ground decisions to impose or withhold
accomplice liability in particular cases. Of course, it is possible that this
worry might be answered with further work. But I think the questions
facing Yaffe’s view at least provide motivation to continue the search
for the mens rea for complicity.68
C. The Derivative Approach
An altogether different approach is to give up on the idea that there is
a single mens rea that the accomplice necessarily possesses, and instead
take the mens rea for complicity to vary with the mens rea required for
the underlying crime.
Weiss aptly labels this the “derivative
approach.”69 Succinctly put, this is the view that “[t]he state of mind
required [for] aiding and abetting is the same as that required to prove
the principal offense.”70 Weiss traces this approach back to the Second
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Jones.71 The legal rationale for
this approach, according to the Jones court, was that Congress’s intent
in enacting the aider and abettor statute was to “erase whatever
distinctions may have previously existed between different classes of

68. Sherif Girgis has recently offered a different single mens rea approach, which follows in
the footsteps of Yaffe’s view. Sherif Girgis, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability: Supporting
Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 460 (2013). On Girgis’s view, you are an accomplice when you aid the
principal’s conduct with the intent that the principal keep his intention to perform the underlying
crime. However, this approach is deeply flawed for the simple reason that there clearly can be
cases of complicity where the accomplice simply has no intention whatsoever about whether the
principal keeps her intention to do the crime. For example, I might simply intend to aid you in
your conduct and be well aware that you are committing a crime, but entirely indifferent as to
whether you succeed in accomplishing the crime or not. (This can be illustrated using any case
where mere knowledge seems sufficient for complicity—e.g., Yaffe’s getaway car driver. Yaffe,
supra note 37, at 10.)
69. Weiss, supra note 2, at 1410–14.
70. United States v. Mangual-Corchado, 139 F.3d 34, 51 (1st Cir. 1998).
71. 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc). It is not clear whether the Second Circuit adopts the
derivative approach across the board any longer. See, e.g., United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237,
1245 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We also do not find it problematic that, in a seeming paradox, it is easier to
prove principal liability under § 894(a)(1) than aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. . . .
[A]iding and abetting requires a finding of specific intent or purpose to bring about the crime
whereas § 894(a)(1) only requires knowledge.” (citations omitted)).
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principals and between principals and aiders or abettors.”72 Therefore,
since the statute provides that an aider and abettor is punishable as a
principal, one might assume that Congress intended for the aider and
abettor’s mens rea to be the same as the mens rea required for the
principal to be guilty of the underlying offense. 73 (I take no stand on
whether this argument for the derivative approach is sound.)
Despite its greater flexibility, the derivative approach suffers from
normative flaws. One initial question is that complicity appears to be a
unified phenomenon, and so it is not clear why the standard for being an
accomplice should vary depending on the nature of the underlying
offense. After all, it is not obvious why altering the mens rea required
for the underlying offense would have any bearing on what it takes to be
an accomplice. The explanation, it seems, must be that by making the
mens rea for complicity vary in tandem with the mens rea for the
underlying offense, the derivative approach seeks to ensure that
accomplice liability for a given crime is only imposed if the defendant
is roughly as culpable as the principal. But if this is the basic thought
behind the derivative approach, the approach fails to make good on that
rationale. The reason, as I’ll now go on to argue, is that the derivative
approach allows defendants who are substantially less culpable than the
principal to be convicted as an accomplice to the underlying offense,
and therefore punishable as a principle.
Indeed, this is the main normative difficulty with the derivative
approach: it allows aiders to be convicted as principals despite being
substantially less culpable than the principal—an intuitively unfair
result. Consider Sanford Kadish’s example of a father who knows his
twenty-year-old son is prone to taking reckless joyrides.74 Nonetheless,
the father asks his son to fill the car with gas and gives him the keys.
Predictably, after filling up, the son joyrides and kills a pedestrian
(which could have been avoided with normal careful driving). The son
is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a crime for which recklessness
toward the victim’s death suffices.75
On the derivative approach, the father is an accomplice. Since
72. Jones, 308 F.2d at 31.
73. For cases that adopt the derivative approach, see Weiss, supra note 2, 1415–16 n.340.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The defendants were
charged with aiding and abetting the use of a firearm. An aider and abettor must share in the
criminal intent of the principal. To establish the state of mind required for a § 924(c) conviction,
the government must prove that a defendant had knowledge of the firearm. To convict, the jury
was required to find, therefore, that each defendant as an aider and abettor knew that the gun was
at least available to one of the defendants.” (citations omitted)).
74. Kadish, supra note 50, at 380–81.
75. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a) (1985).
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recklessness toward the death is the mens rea for the underlying crime,
the same mens rea is required for being an accomplice to that crime.
The father likely believed the probability of a death resulting from his
son’s driving to be lower than what the son believed it to be while
joyriding. After all, the father is not certain the son will joyride, but the
son, while driving, is certain of this. Nonetheless, supposing the father
is aware of a high enough chance of death to count as reckless as to the
death, he would have the mens rea for complicity on the derivative
approach. However, this result seems implausible. The father
intuitively is significantly less culpable for his part in bringing about the
death than the son. It is the son, after all, who is responsible for the
decision to take a joyride in the first place.
One possible, but I think ultimately unsuccessful, response is this:
One might think that the father here is still culpable enough to warrant
being convicted for involuntary manslaughter, even if he is less culpable
than his son. Perhaps we can suppose that for each crime, there is a
minimum level of culpability that must be attained in order for
conviction of that crime to be deserved. Assuming there is such a
minimum level, it then would not be unjust to convict the father of
involuntary manslaughter as an accomplice if the father’s culpability
level is at least as high as the minimum required level for this crime.
Nonetheless, this answer is inadequate to fully defuse the objection.
After all, it is unclear how we might even begin to go about determining
what this minimum culpability level is for any particular crime, and so it
is doubtful that there is any such level for each crime. (There are other
problems with the present response as well.76)
Thus, the derivative approach is problematic because it allows
accomplices to be punishable as a principal even when significantly less
culpable than the principal. Why is this a problem? Most importantly,
76. Even if there were such a minimum culpability level for involuntary manslaughter,
problems remain. The father’s contribution to the crime is much less substantial than that of the
son, and the lion’s share of the responsibility for the death would lie with the son. The father’s
culpability level depends not merely on his mens rea toward the underlying crime, but also on the
extent of his expected causal contribution to the bad results that are an element of that crime.
This means that we can imagine variations of this father-and-son case where the father’s
recklessness toward the death of the victim remains constant, but his expected causal contribution
is progressively lessened (e.g., by making it progressively easier for the son to gain access to a car
for his joyrides). At some point, the father’s culpability for the death of the victim will dip below
the minimum culpability threshold required for involuntary manslaughter. Nonetheless, the
derivative approach would say that accomplice liability should still be imposed on the father even
in such a case simply because he had a reckless mental state toward the death of the pedestrian.
Accordingly, we can be quite sure that versions of this father-and-son counterexample will arise
for the derivative approach regardless of what the minimum culpability level for involuntary
manslaughter might be.
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because it is in tension with the intuitive principle that two people
should be punished alike only if they are equally culpable. One might
respond that judges can take such differences in culpability into account
when exercising their sentencing discretion.77 Nonetheless, there is
something worrisome about convicting two individuals with
substantially different culpability levels of the same crime. After all,
this not only means that both are condemned with equal force by the
law in virtue of being convicted of the same crime, but also that they are
subjected to the same panoply of sentencing options. Relying on
judges’ sentencing discretion to avoid imposing similar punishments on
those with substantially different culpability is at best an imperfect
after-the-fact solution. Better to avoid the problem from the outset.
III. THE AGENCY LAW APPROACH: ENDORSING THE CRIME
A different, older sort of approach to the mens rea for complicity
relies on an analogy to agency law. This approach is commonly given
short shrift, often being subject to easily-answered objections. But this
approach merits careful consideration, for its insights and shortcomings
are instructive.
A. First-Pass Formulation of the View: The Real Endorsement Account
Sanford Kadish explains the basic idea behind the agency law
approach as follows:
The explanation for the intention requirement . . . may reside in the
notion of agreement as the paradigm mode by which a principal in
agency law (the second party in the terminology of the criminal law)
becomes liable for the acts of another person. The liability of the
principal in civil law rests essentially on his consent to be bound by
the actions of his agent, who he vests with authority for this purpose.78

More explicitly, this analogy to agency law may be summarized as
follows: On the civil side, the principal authorizes the act of his agent
(or ratifies it after the fact) and in this way the principal consents to be
bound by the acts of the agent. Adapting this idea to the criminal law,
the criminal accomplice (or secondary party) is understood as the
analog of the civil law principal. The perpetrator of the underlying
crime (the primary defendant) is understood as the analog of the civil
law agent. Thus, insofar as the accomplice authorizes or endorses the
primary wrongdoer’s conduct, he is deemed to have consented to be
“bound” by it—i.e., responsible for that conduct and its (foreseeable)

77. See supra note 21 (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory).
78. Kadish, supra note 18, at 354.
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consequences.
One might have doubts about this basic sketch of the view, depending
on how the details are spelled out. In particular, trouble seems to arise
if the theory is formulated in terms of either consent to be bound or
authorization. But these preliminary problems can be avoided, I
suggest, by appeal to the idea that the mens rea required for being an
accomplice is an attitude akin to the intuitive notion of endorsing the
principal’s underlying criminal conduct. This notion of endorsement
can be understood roughly as the attitude of being in favor of the
principal’s conduct, or positively inclined toward it. (In the next Part, a
notion akin to endorsement will be formulated with greater precision. It
will form the centerpiece of my own account of the mens rea for
complicity.79)
To start, some have objected to this sort of agency law view on the
ground that consent to be bound often is not present in real cases of
complicity. One commentator, for example, worries that “[n]ormally,
of course, accomplices never actually consent to being liable for
another’s crimes. If given a choice, who would?”80 However, this
objection is misguided since virtually no one would knowingly accept
liability—i.e., the penalties—for another person’s misconduct if the
alternative is to avoid such liability. However, people might very well
consent to be on the hook for the actions of another before it is known
whether any liability will ensue. That is, one might well accept the risk
of sanctions in return for the perceived benefits of aiding or partaking in
the principal’s crime.
Still, there is a deeper worry here, which is that actual consent to be
bound is intuitively too high a bar for accomplice liability. In many
cases the accomplice will not actually consent to be bound by the
principal’s crime—i.e., will not think to himself when acting: “I know
there’s a chance I might get punished for this, but I’m ok with that; I’ll
help the principal come what may.” Nonetheless, this concern can be
answered. For in many cases where actual consent to be bound is
lacking, the accomplice might still possess an attitude of approval or
endorsement toward the principal’s conduct. And acting to help the
principal with such an attitude of endorsement seems to be a fair basis
for attributing the consent to be bound to the accomplice—i.e., for
taking there to be constructive consent on the part of the accomplice.
Thus, the way to construe the theory under consideration is to say that
being an accomplice requires acting to aid the principal with something
79. See infra Part IV (developing the condoning theory of complicity).
80. Girgis, supra note 68, at 482.
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like the mental state of endorsement toward the principal’s criminal
conduct (or at least the relevant elements of the crime, even if not the
principal’s action under the description “crime”).
A second, somewhat related objection to the present type of theory
would arise if the agency law principal-agent metaphor is taken
seriously, and the view were spelled out in terms of authorization. The
trouble is that the principal-agent metaphor seems strained in many
actual cases of criminal activity involving multiple actors. Recall that
this metaphor in the criminal context is premised on the accomplice’s
authorizing (or ratifying) the conduct of the primary defendant, such
that the accomplice is analogous to the civil law principal and the
primary defendant corresponds to the civil law agent. However, in
many cases the accomplice clearly will not be in any position to decide
whether or not to authorize the principal’s actions.81 Perhaps the
accomplice would be in a position to do so if he were the one who
ordered, initiated, or requested that the principal engage in the
underlying criminal conduct—as when the accomplice is the
mastermind and the principal is the henchman. But in very many cases,
this sort of power relation will not be present. Often the accomplice
will merely be an assistant or a helper of the principal. 82 If the principal
is the leader and the accomplice is merely a hanger-on, someone who
takes a back seat and only assists the primary defendant, then it seems
the accomplice would be in no position to authorize or permit the
primary defendant’s conduct.83
As with the first worry, the answer to this problem is to construe the
theory in terms of the accomplice’s endorsement of the principal’s
conduct. After all, even where the accomplice is not the leader of the
group of wrongdoers, but rather merely an assistant or helper, the
accomplice might nonetheless act from an attitude of endorsement
toward the principal’s conduct. Accordingly, it is more plausible to
premise accomplice liability on the mental state of endorsement than to
premise it directly on agency law concepts like authorization and
ratification.
With these clarifications in hand, a first-pass statement of the agency
law theory can now be given. I call it the “real endorsement account”
81. As Dressler notes, sometimes they will merely be “bit players.” Dressler, supra note 10,
at 447.
82. Id.
83. Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New
Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 110 (1985) (objecting to the agency law
theory on the ground that a “criminal accomplice is responsible for the acts of another [P] even
if . . . [P] is not under the accessory’s direct control or supervision”).
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because it depends on whether the putative accomplice really acts with
the mental state of endorsement.
Real Endorsement Account: Putative accomplice, D, is guilty of
crime, C, as an accomplice if and only if:
1) D voluntarily does something in aid of (that influences,
assists, or makes easier) the principal, P’s, commission of
some legally unjustified and unexcused conduct,84 and
2) D acts to provide this aid with the requisite attitude of
endorsement toward P’s conduct (i.e., either under the
description “crime,” “wrong,” etc., or else simply toward
each of the relevant elements of the crime).85
One welcome result of this view is that it captures cases in which the
accomplice does not consciously consider whether to endorse the
underlying criminal conduct or expressly think to himself that he
consents to be bound by it. After all, being in favor of the principal’s
conduct, or being positively inclined toward it, does not require thinking
to oneself when helping the principal: “I approve of what he is doing.”
The accomplice can act from the requisite attitude of endorsement even
if his approval of the crime does not expressly figure into the content of
an occurrent thought (just as one can act on a desire even without
consciously thinking “I want this”). A second beneficial result of this
account is that it avoids the result that after-the-fact expressions of
approval of a crime can transform one into an accomplice—a possibility
that has worried some commentators.86 The account avoids this
implication because merely possessing the relevant attitude of
84. The phrase “unjustified and unexcused conduct” is used here, rather than “crime,” for the
reasons explained in Kadish, supra note 18, at 341–42 (“Sometimes the principal, though having
violated the law with the required mens rea and without excuse or justification, enjoys some
special defense that would have precluded his conviction at any time [like] a defense of
diplomatic immunity or entrapment. . . . There seems no reason not to impose accomplice liability
upon a person who helps him.” (emphasis added)).
85. Although it is already implicit in 2), one might add a further condition requiring that there
be the right kind of causal connection between 1) and 2). In particular, 1) must have been
produced by or motivated by the mental state of endorsement mentioned in 2). If that attitude of
endorsement is motivationally inert, then it is not clear that one would have a genuine case of
complicity. This is the well-known concurrence requirement. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 6.3
(explaining that “[w]ith those crimes which require some mental fault . . . in addition to an act or
omission, it is a basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law that the physical conduct and the
state of mind must concur,” where “concurrence” requires that the mental fault “actuates” the
criminal act or omission).
86. For example, in discussing the closely related “forfeiture theory,” Dressler objects that “a
pure forfeiture system would justify punishment of those who ratify prior criminal acts.”
Dressler, supra note 83, at 117.
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endorsement (i.e., satisfying 2)) does not suffice for complicity. In
addition, one must act to aid the commission of the crime (i.e., satisfy
1)). After-the-fact expressions of approval of a crime may satisfy
condition 2), but do not satisfy condition 1).
Now, one might wonder how such an agency theory relates to the
traditional mens rea categories of the criminal law: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence.87 The answer is that these traditional
mens rea categories can serve as proxies for the underlying attitude of
endorsement that in fact is required for being an accomplice. Thus, a
jurisdiction that takes, for example, mere knowledge to be the mens rea
for complicity would implicitly be assuming that to knowingly aid a
crime is sufficient for having the requisite kind of endorsement. Of
course, such an assumption may be disputed. But this just shows that
on agency law theories (like the real endorsement account), to
understand complicity in terms of just one of the familiar mens rea
categories (as most courts do) can best be an approximation—a
practical implementation, as it were—of the mental state that in fact
figures into complicity.
B. A More Sophisticated Formulation: The Objective Endorsement
Account
Despite its attractions, the real endorsement account faces problems
of a certain sort that have led some commentators to incorporate an
additional piece of machinery into the theory. 88 In particular, it seems
that there can be cases where one does not actually endorse the
wrongdoing of the principal, but still actively and knowingly aids it in a
way that makes it appropriate to regard one as an accomplice.
For example, suppose Pete is a security expert with a knack for
finding flaws in high-tech security systems.89 One day, Pete learns that
his neighbor, Thomas, is on his way to kill his rival who lives in a
mansion across the street. The mansion has the most advanced security
system on the market—supposedly impenetrable. Thomas was simply
planning to blast his way into the mansion. But Pete had been studying
precisely this system and realizes that this is the perfect opportunity to
test his hypothesis that the system has a critical flaw. By pressing just a
few buttons on the keypad, the system can be tricked into thinking that
an intruder is an authorized visitor, thus creating a few minutes’ delay
87. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985) (defining the mental states of purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence).
88. Cf., e.g., Kadish, supra note 18, at 354–55 (discussing the idea of manifesting one’s
consent to be bound).
89. Thanks to Jake Ross for very helpful conversations about cases of this sort.
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before the authorities are notified. If Pete simply crosses the street and
presses a few buttons for Thomas, he can demonstrate the flaw and
prove himself once and for all to be the preeminent expert in his field.
Now, Pete has nothing whatsoever against Thomas’s rival, abhors
killing in general, and does not want Thomas to go through with the
crime. Thus, Pete does not endorse the crime and would prevent it if he
could. But he knows that in this case he is powerless to stop the crime.
Without Pete’s help, Thomas would have blasted his way in anyway,
though this would have alerted the police a bit sooner and increased his
chances of getting caught somewhat. Thus, let’s stipulate, Pete’s aid
will at best lessen the risks and burdens Thomas faces in committing the
crime. (Moreover, Thomas is heavily armed and it’s useless for Pete to
try to use defensive force against him. There are no police in the area,
Pete does not have a telephone at hand to warn the intended victim, and
so on.) Accordingly, Pete reasons that since Thomas will carry out the
crime with or without his help, he might as well use this perfect
occasion to prove skill as a security analyst. So he presses a few
buttons on the keypad, tricks the system and proves that the
hypothesized flaw does exist. Thomas gains entry to the mansion, as he
inevitably would, and kills his rival.
Is Pete an accomplice to Thomas’s murder? Intuitively the answer is
“Yes.” Although Pete was not a but-for cause of the crime, he
nonetheless engaged in conduct that he knew would make it somewhat
easier for Thomas to accomplish his criminal aims. Moreover, although
Pete did not subjectively endorse or condone the killing, he nonetheless
voluntarily involved himself in the crime when he did not have to. He
could, after all, merely have stood back and avoided getting involved in
the crime in any way. His decision to help out Thomas, despite the onbalance small degree of help provided, seems to be a sufficient basis for
treating him as an accomplice to Thomas’s crime.90
But notice that the real endorsement account cannot capture the result
that Pete is any sort of accomplice. After all, Pete was stipulated not to
have the requisite attitude of endorsement that the account takes to be
necessary for complicity. By hypothesis, Pete does not endorse or
desire Thomas’s crime. If he were in a position to stop him from
committing it, he would do so. Accordingly, the real endorsement
account entails that Pete is not an accomplice of any kind.
These considerations might motivate one to move away from
formulating the view in terms of real or actual endorsement, and
90. One might worry that it would be unfair to convict Pete of murder on a complicity theory.
After all, he seems much less culpable than Thomas. This is a problem I return to below.
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instead to formulate it in terms of objectively manifesting one’s
endorsement of the underlying crime. After all, one might think that
even though Pete subjectively does not endorse Thomas’s crime, he
nonetheless sends signals that would make it reasonable for an objective
observer to infer that he does endorse it. Kadish introduces this idea by
analogizing to contract law: “Under the prevailing objective approach of
contract law, it is the principal’s manifestation of consent, rather than
his subjective state of mind, that determines the authority of the agent
and rights of third parties.”91 The implication is that criminal
complicity works the same way. Thus, Kadish offers the following,
more complete summary of the agency law view:
Insofar as manifesting consent to be bound by the acts of another is a
general requirement for holding one person liable for the actions of
another, the requirement of intention for complicity liability becomes
more readily explicable. Obviously, in the context of the criminal law,
literal consent to be criminally liable is irrelevant.
But by
intentionally acting to further the criminal actions of another, the
secondary party voluntarily identifies himself with the principal party.
The intention to further the act of another, which creates liability
under the criminal law, may be understood as equivalent to
manifesting consent to liability under the civil law.92

For the reasons given above, Kadish’s talk of manifesting consent to
be bound should be replaced with talk of manifesting endorsement of
the primary defendant’s underlying crime. With this substitution, we
can state an objectified version of the endorsement theory as follows:
Objective Endorsement Account: Putative accomplice, D, is
guilty of crime, C, as an accomplice if and only if:
1) D voluntarily does something in aid of (that influences or
assists) the principal, P’s, commission of some legally
unjustified and unexcused conduct, and
2) D’s act of aid was done with a mental state, M, toward P’s
conduct (either under the description “crime,” “wrong,” etc.,
or the relevant elements of the crime), and M together with
the aid provided, would lead an objective observer to
reasonably understand D to endorse the criminality of P’s
conduct.
More simply, this account says that you are an accomplice when you
objectively signal, by your aid and attitude toward the underlying crime,
91. Kadish, supra note 18, at 354.
92. Id. at 354–55 (emphasis added).
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that you endorse the criminal conduct of the principal and that this
endorsement is powerful enough to manifest itself in your own actions.
This account also allows that giving aid with one of the traditional mens
rea categories like knowledge (or even recklessness) could, in principle,
be enough to objectively signal that you possess the required attitude of
endorsement. However, there is nothing in the account that requires
that this always be the case either. In general, your mens rea and
actions in aid of the underlying crime will serve as evidence from which
we can determine whether you in fact endorsed the crime, and such a
determination will have to be made on a case-by-case basis (or perhaps
with the help of simplifying assumptions adopted by the jurisdiction in
question).
This, then, is what I take to be the most sophisticated version of the
agency law theory. It does seem to get a number of cases right. In
addition to the case of Pete, it also seems to get both versions of the
getaway car driver case right.93 We saw above that regardless of
whether the getaway car driver positively knew that his passengers
would rob the bank, or merely was reckless about the matter (i.e.,
believed there was a 65% chance that they would rob it), it is intuitive
that he should be counted an accomplice. The objective endorsement
theory explains why this is the case. In particular, it seems plausible
that a reasonable observer would infer from the aid rendered by the
driver, together with his mental state toward the crime (whether it be
knowledge or recklessness), that the driver endorsed the crime.
Moreover, this account also gets the statistical panhandler case right. 94
In particular, it seems plausible that giving money to several
panhandlers does not make one an accomplice to a drug buy, even if
one knows statistically that at least one of them will use the money on
drugs. Especially given that the money might have been given from
goodwill or compassion, or perhaps from the idealistic hope that the
money would not be used on drugs, it is doubtful that a reasonable
observer would infer that the benefactor endorses any of these
panhandlers’ purchases of drugs.95
93. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
95. The same might be true for the case of the gun salesman who sells a firearm to someone
knowing that it will be used for a crime. Insofar as one thinks that the gun salesman should not
be deemed an accomplice (I myself am unsure about this case), the objective endorsement
account can explain this. One might think that because engaging in commerce is generally a
beneficial activity, if a permissible aim like seeking to make a reasonable profit is the only thing
that motivated the gun salesman, then a reasonable observer might not infer from his conduct that
he endorsed or condoned the crime for which he knew the gun would be used. I am not saying
this is the right implication about this case. But if one thinks it is, then the objective endorsement
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Note in closing that one natural objection to this view—i.e., that it is
inappropriate to carry over civil agency law principles to the criminal
context—appears misplaced. Dressler, for example, objects to the
agency law theory (among other reasons) because “fundamentally,
criminal law is based on moral blame, stigma and punishment rather
than on business and financial considerations,”96 which underlie agency
law. However, this objection, without more, is not convincing. Just
because the aims and concerns of one area of law differ from those that
underlie another, it does not follow that certain principles or
mechanisms at work in the one area cannot operate in the other—even if
the mode of operation or scope of applicability is different as between
the two areas. That is what we seem to have when it comes to the law
of agency and the law of complicity.97
C. The Trouble with the Endorsement Account
Despite its advantages, I think the objective endorsement account
suffers from problems serious enough to warrant its rejection. It is
undermined by at least two normative problems.
First, the objective endorsement account has trouble with a modified
version of the Pete and Thomas case.98 Recall that the objectified
version of the account was supposed to give the correct implication
about the original case because although Pete subjectively does not
endorse or condone Thomas’s crime, he nonetheless objectively signals
that he does. But now consider a version of the case in which Pete not
only subjectively lacks the requisite endorsement, but also objectively
signals that fact. Perhaps he does this by carrying a sign with him,
account has the resources to explain it.
96. Dressler, supra note 83, at 115.
97. Michael Moore’s objection to the agency theory is also answerable. He writes:
Yet this vicarious (or agency) interpretation of complicity does not begin to cover
cases where accomplice liability has been imposed. There is no requirement that one
be a conspirator to be an accomplice. If I aid you by finding a ladder, placing a gun
where you can find it, and making sure the victim is where you can find him, I am
liable as an accomplice for whatever crimes I am trying to promote with such aid, even
if there is no prior agreement between us. Moreover, in most states, complicity
requires more than mere agreement or group membership; one has to aid the
commission of a crime to be an accomplice, and in such states the aiding required
cannot be reduced to mere group membership or general agreement.
Moore, supra note 14, at 400. This objection is unpersuasive. Granted, complicity and
conspiracy liability are not coextensive. Nonetheless, the agency theory does not reduce
complicity to conspiracy. The agency theory does not entail that an agreement is necessary for
accomplice liability (as it is for conspiracy). Rather, the agency theory only requires that there be
aid together with the requisite attitude of endorsement. And of course that can happen without an
agreement between the parties.
98. Again thanks to Jake Ross for pressing me on this point.
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which reads, “I do not endorse Thomas’s crime; I just want to show I’m
right that all security system have flaws!” If a sign would not lead a
reasonable observer to conclude that Pete lacks the requisite
endorsement, note that additional details can be added until the observer
would reach this conclusion. Suppose Pete posted a notice to this effect
on his website. Moreover, suppose he wrote a letter carefully
explaining why he disapproves of Thomas’s actions, but nonetheless
finds it necessary to use this occasion to demonstrate that the mansion’s
security system is flawed as he hypothesized. Suppose the letter was
not written after the fact in self-serving fashion, but was written in
advance in circumstances that make it entirely credible. As the case is
further refined, it becomes harder and harder for reasonable observers to
avoid the conclusion that Pete does not endorse Thomas’s crime.
Accordingly, as the case is elaborated, we reach a point where Pete
objectively signals that he does not endorse the crime. Thus, he
wouldn’t be an accomplice on the objective endorsement account. But
this is counterintuitive. Surely, Pete is at least some kind of accomplice
even though he neither subjectively favors the crime nor signals that he
endorses it. Thus, the present account is in trouble.
More generally, the trouble arises because the objective endorsement
account makes complicity depend on what it is reasonable to infer from
the available evidence. While the defendant’s act in aid of the
underlying crime might create a presumption that the defendant
endorses the crime, the facts known in a particular case could
conclusively rebut this presumption. The facts of certain cases might
lead honest reasonable observers to infer that endorsement is lacking,
even though the defendant deliberately aided the underlying crime.
Such cases pose problems for the objectified version of the account.
The objective endorsement account also suffers from a second
normative problem. In particular, it entails that ignorance of the law—
or the criminal nature of the primary defendant’s conduct—cannot be a
defense, even in cases when this seems to dramatically reduce the
accomplice’s culpability. Consider a layperson who is negligently
unaware that in some technical area, the criminal law prohibits certain
conduct (e.g., failing to file reports with the IRS for cash transactions in
excess of $10,00099). Moreover, suppose this person proceeds to aid
someone else in knowingly engaging in just this conduct. Suppose that

99. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Inv’rs of Pittsburgh, Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 1097–98 (3d Cir.
1989) (discussing the obligation of “banks to file a report of each deposit, withdrawal and
exchange of currency which involves the physical transfer of currency of more than $10,000”);
see also 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2015).
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the aider does not endorse the criminality of the principal’s conduct, and
but for negligently failing to realize that the conduct was criminal, she
would not have aided in the way she did. Intuitively, the aider is much
less culpable than the primary wrongdoer (who, let’s suppose, performs
the prohibited conduct knowing that it is criminal). In such a case, it
might seem problematic to hold the aider fully responsible for the
underlying crime as an accomplice. Nonetheless, by intentionally
aiding the principal, the aider might seem to at least objectively signal
that she endorses the underlying crime.
Thus, the objective
endorsement view seems to implausibly entail that the person in
question should be held fully responsible for the crime as an
accomplice.100
D. How to Move Forward
It is worth considering what lesson is to be drawn from these worries,
since doing so points the way to a more satisfactory account. In light of
the two problems just presented for the objective endorsement account,
the natural move seems to be to strip the account of the requirement that
one objectively manifest one’s endorsement. This, after all, seems to be
the source of the problems just discussed. This move, however, would
revive the problem based on the original Pete case, which motivated
incorporating the objective manifestation requirement into the theory.
So if we are to return to some version of the real endorsement account,
how do we deal with the original case of Pete?
Recall the problem: Intuitively, Pete is an accomplice even though
the real endorsement account entails that he is not, since he does not
subjectively endorse Thomas’s crime. But to this, it is possible to
respond that Pete really should not be labeled an accomplice who is
punishable as a principal. After all, he seems substantially less culpable
for his small involvement in the crime than Thomas, the principal killer.
Is it really fair to convict Pete of something as serious as murder on a
complicity theory, given that he only aided the crime in a minor way
and subjectively did not endorse the crime (indeed, overtly disapproved
of it)? It might seem quite unjust to open Pete up to the full range of
sentencing options that accompanies a conviction for murder.101

100. Note that this objection is similar in structure to the problem that undermined the
derivative approach discussed in Part II.C. Both objections involve cases where full accomplice
liability would be imposed even though the accomplice is much less culpable than the principal.
101. Some of this unfairness might be mitigated at the sentencing stage by way of the
sentencing judge’s discretion to give lesser sentences for less culpable conduct. But I do not
think this is sufficient to eliminate the problem. Mandatory minimums would still be triggered,
and Pete would still face the stigma and condemnation that results from being convicted for
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Therefore, a better reply to this objection, I suggest, is to recognize
that complicity comes in degrees, and that accomplices accordingly can
have different levels of culpability. While Pete is not as culpable as
someone who himself commits murder, Pete nonetheless is somewhat
complicit in Thomas’s crime because of the manner in which he
participated in it. Pete thus may appear not to be a full accomplice, but
rather only a partial or lesser accomplice. The trouble, though, with the
real endorsement account (like the other accounts discussed to this
point) is that it makes complicity an on-off affair: either one provides
some aid to the crime while endorsing it, or one does not, and this is all
there is to the question of whether one is an accomplice. The real
endorsement account ultimately fails, therefore, because it entails that
Pete is no sort of accomplice at all given that he lacked the requisite
attitude of endorsement.
Thus, a more normatively defensible account of complicity should
recognize that one’s degree of attitudinal support for the crime, as well
as the amount of help one seeks to provide for it, can differ in ways that
affect one’s culpability as an accomplice. Other commentators have
pressed related points (against the agency law theory, in fact). Dressler,
for one, writes that “moral intuition suggests that not all accomplices
are alike, and . . . their categorical treatment as if they are perpetrators is
not necessarily fair.”102 In the next Part, I formulate an account of
complicity that makes room for differences of just this sort. In
particular, I formulate a version of the endorsement account on which
the mens rea for complicity itself can come in degrees. By doing so, I
aim to offer a more normatively justified account of the mens rea for
complicity.
IV. TOWARD A BETTER ACCOUNT OF THE MENS REA FOR COMPLICITY
A. Sketching the Account
In this Part, I aim to rehabilitate a version of the agency law theory
discussed in the previous Part. To do this, I shall back off of the
objectified component of the endorsement account for the reasons just
discussed in Parts III.C and III.D. This amounts to returning to a
version of the real endorsement account. However, as noted, this might
immediately seem problematic, since Pete was stipulated not to favor,
desire, or bear any other pro-attitude toward Thomas’s crime.103
murder.
102. Dressler, supra note 83, at 118.
103. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing the first version of the Pete
hypothetical).
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Wouldn’t taking the mens rea for complicity to be endorsement
implausibly entail that Pete is not an accomplice?
This problem, however, can be avoided by a more sophisticated
understanding of the requisite attitude. To see what this attitude is,
more precisely, notice that complicity can involve more than mere proattitudes. Being an accomplice does not seem to require that one is
positively in favor of the crime or affirmatively desire its completion.
Even if you did not positively favor or endorse the underlying crime in
the sense of having a pro-attitude toward it, you still might condone the
crime in the sense that you are willing to tolerate or accept its
performance.104 This, too, seems sufficient to make you an accomplice.
Even if you did not actually favor or authorize the crime, and perhaps
would even stop it if you could, it seems to be enough for complicity
that you merely were willing to tolerate the crime in order to obtain
certain benefits from its performance. Accordingly, the current
proposal is that the mental state of condoning the crime should be
regarded as the mens rea for complicity. (Perhaps the phrase
“endorsing the crime” could still be used here, but I think “condoning”
better conveys the idea of being willing to tolerate a crime even without
affirmatively favoring it.)
Let me be more precise about what it is to condone a crime. The
basic idea is that it involves being insufficiently against the crime—
either by positively approving of the crime (i.e., having a pro-attitude
toward it) or by being insufficiently repelled by it (i.e., having an
insufficient motivational aversion to it).
Moreover, to be an
accomplice, one must act on this mental state of condoning the crime—
i.e., manifest it in action through performing some voluntary action that
apparently aids the primary wrongdoer in his underlying conduct.105

104. Cf. Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953
(1998) (giving a counterfactual account of the notion of acceptance).
105. This talk of “manifestation” is included because “an actor’s mere possession of [a]
legally relevant mental state[] hardly suffices for criminal liability. Free-floating desires,
intentions, beliefs, or attitudes, without more, do not justify criminal liability. In addition, the
mental state must be ‘connected’ to the relevant criminal act or omission in the right way.” Ken
Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for “Bad Character”?
Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
219, 230 (2002). Thus, for punishment for a mental state to be warranted, that “mental state or
culpability requirement[] must be appropriately expressed in, or connected to, action.” Id. at 261.
See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 15.01, at 508 (Matthew Bender
& Co. eds., 6th ed. 2012) (observing that the “principle of concurrence contains two
components:” first, “the defendant must possess the requisite mens rea at the same moment” as
the actus reus, and second, “[t]he defendant’s conduct that caused the social harm must have been
set into motion or impelled by the thought process that constituted the mens rea of the offense”);
1 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.3(a), at 451 (2d ed. 2003) (“With those
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Note, however, that it is also possible to be justified in condoning the
crime. This could happen if, say, the crime itself is justified (e.g.,
because of necessity or self-defense) or if one has some justification of
one’s own for condoning it. But justifiably condoning some conduct
does not seem to make one guilty as an accomplice to it. Instead, being
guilty of a crime as an accomplice seems to require unjustifiably
condoning it. Accordingly, we can characterize the mental state
required for complicity as follows:
Unjustifiable Condoning: Putative accomplice, D, possesses an
unjustifiably condoning mental state toward the primary actor,
P’s, wrong or bad action, A, if D is insufficiently motivationally
repelled by A, where this can involve either a pro-attitude
toward A or an insufficient aversion to A. The greater D’s
failure to be sufficiently repelled by A, the greater the degree to
which D condones P’s doing A.
Notice that not just any amount of failing to be repelled by the
underlying crime will count as unjustifiably condoning it. Rather, only
a failure to be sufficiently repelled by it will count as unjustifiable
condoning. Thus, by attaching accomplice liability only to unjustifiable
condoning, the criminal law will necessarily have to take a stand on
what counts as being insufficiently repelled by the crime—i.e., a failure
that constitutes a punishable departure from the attitudes and conduct
that are expected of a law-abiding citizen.
Given the discussion thus far, it should be clear that there are three
paradigm cases of unjustifiably condoning a crime—i.e., three ways in
which the putative accomplice might fail to be sufficiently
motivationally repelled by it:
(1) In the first case, the putative accomplice, D, feels some
motivational pressure in favor of bringing about the action,
A, of the primary wrongdoer, P, even though D should not,
since A’s bad-making features106 give reason not to bring
crimes which require some mental fault (whether intention, knowledge, recklessness, or
negligence) in addition to an act or omission, it is a basic premise of Anglo-American criminal
law that the physical conduct and the state of mind must concur.”). The connection requirement
has also been codified in some states’ criminal codes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (2014)
(“In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or
criminal negligence.”). See generally Alex Sarch, Knowledge, Recklessness and the Connection
Requirement Between Actus Reus and Mens Rea, 120 PENN STATE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
106. A bad-making feature of an action is simply a property it possesses that contributes to the
badness of the action. For more on this notion, and the related idea of wrong-making features,
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about P’s A-ing (and there are no other reasons sufficient to
justify bringing about P’s A-ing).
(2) In the second case, D feels no motivational pressure against
bringing about P’s A-ing although he should—again,
because A’s bad-making features give reason not to bring it
about and nothing else justifies bringing it about.
(3) In the third case, D feels some motivational pressure against
bringing about P’s A-ing, but the amount (or strength)
thereof is insufficient. As a result, D’s motivation against
bringing about P’s A-ing might be overridden by perceived
reasons in its favor, even though these reasons in fact do not
adequately justify bringing about P’s A-ing.
Note that in principle, a case of type (1) could also be a case of type
(2) or (3). After all, it is possible to incorrectly feel some motivational
attraction toward the crime, while also failing to feel a sufficient
amount of motivational pressure against the crime.
Given this general sketch of the mental state of unjustifiably
condoning a crime, we can now state the condoning theory of
complicity as follows:
Condoning Theory of Complicity: Defendant, D, is an
accomplice to principal, P’s, crime, C, if and only if:
1) D voluntarily does something in aid of (that influences,
assists, or makes easier) P’s commission of some legally
unjustified and unexcused conduct, and
2) D provides this aid from the mental state of unjustifiably
condoning P’s conduct—i.e., D’s act of aid is produced by or
is a manifestation of that mental state.107
One of the primary benefits of taking the mens rea of complicity to
be unjustifiable condoning is that one can condone the crime to a
greater or lesser extent. This allows us to say that there are degrees of
complicity, purely in virtue of the mens rea associated with accomplice
liability (and not merely in virtue of the causal contribution one might
have made to the underlying crime, as other commentators like Dressler
and Weiss have suggested108).

see, for example, MARK TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 349 (2d ed. 2012).
107. This talk of “production” or “expression” is included for the reasons articulated in supra
note 105.
108. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text; see also infra note 126 (noting that many
scholars have supported the idea of recognizing varying degrees of complicity).
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B. The Case of Pete Redux
Because the condoning theory allows for degrees of complicity, it
handles the case of Pete well. First, note that Pete can qualify as an
accomplice even though he does not desire, favor, or have any other
overt pro-attitude toward the underlying crime. While he did not
positively endorse or approve of Thomas’s murder, Pete nonetheless
was insufficiently repelled by its bad-making features. Pete likely
believed that there were some justifying (or at least excusing)
considerations that made it permissible for him to help Thomas—e.g.,
that Thomas would have completed the crime even without his help and
that Thomas’s entry into the mansion was the perfect opportunity to
demonstrate, once and for all, how skilled a security analyst Pete was.
However, it should be fairly uncontroversial that these considerations in
fact do not justify (or excuse) Pete in easing the path for Thomas to
commit murder. Plausibly, nothing justifies one in aiding the
intentional taking of a life except considerations that would fit
comfortably within a recognized defense like necessity or selfdefense.109 Accordingly, we can conclude that Pete was insufficiently
repelled by the murder. He should have been repelled by Thomas’s
crime to a substantial degree (i.e., should have felt some motivational
aversion to it) because the crime’s bad-making features give reasons
against bringing it about that Thomas does the crime, and nothing
justifies it. Thus, if Pete was repelled by Thomas’s crime at all, this
amount was less than he should have felt. Therefore, Pete unjustifiably
condoned the crime. (This is a case that belongs most naturally in
category (2) or (3) from above.)
In addition, the condoning theory also explains why the various ways
Pete tries to signal that he does not endorse Thomas’s crime—the sign,
the letter, etc.—ring hollow. For all his protestations, he still fails to be
sufficiently repelled by the crime. In particular, he is not repelled
enough to keep his hands clean and avoid participating in the crime.
Now, his insufficient aversion to the crime just is the attitude of
condoning the crime that is required for being an accomplice. As a
result, Pete misunderstands his own mental state when he says that he
does not support the crime. By voluntarily helping out, although he
does not have to, he manifests his insufficient degree of aversion to the
aspects of the crime that make it wrong. Thus, despite his protestations
to the contrary, he does condone the crime somewhat. As a result, what
109. Cf. Simons, supra note 43, at 474 (noting with respect to principal liability that “[o]nce
an actor perceives a ‘highly probable’ risk of physical harm, she is prima facie liable for assault
or murder. She must fit within a limited number of defenses in order to avoid conviction.”).
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his sign and letter claim is simply false, according to the present theory.
The upshot is that in cases like that of Pete, holding up a sign or writing
a letter will not work. Even if one consciously believes that one does
not condone the crime, it is not one’s beliefs about the matter that
determines whether one condones the crime or not. One can condone
even while believing that one does not. In this case, Pete’s action of
aiding the crime demonstrates that he is not sufficiently repelled by it.
Thus, Pete is an accomplice according to the present theory—
intuitively, the right result.
Now, since accomplices are traditionally punished as principals, one
might worry that there is something troubling about taking Pete to be
complicit in the murder. For this means labeling him a murderer and
opening him up to the full range of sentencing options that accompanies
such a conviction. This might seem troubling given that Pete intuitively
is much less culpable for his part in the murder than Thomas, the
primary actor in the killing.110
However, the condoning theory has the resources to deal with this
worry. One of the main benefits of this theory is that it allows
complicity to come in degrees. This stems from the fact that one can
condone a crime to a greater or lesser extent. (Accordingly, my account
differs from the views of other theorists who advocate the recognition of
degrees of complicity, though in virtue of the causal contribution made
to the underlying crime.111) While the present theory counts Pete as
some kind of accomplice, it does not need to take him to be a full
accomplice who is just as culpable as the primary wrongdoer. Rather,
the theory is free to ascribe only a lesser degree of complicity to Pete
because he does not condone the killing very much—certainly not as
much as someone like Thomas who is significantly motivationally
attracted to the killing and purposefully brings it about. After all, Pete
was stipulated not to desire or intend the killing. He merely failed to be
sufficiently repelled by it. But the degree to which he unjustifiably
condones (fails to be repelled by) the killing plausibly is less than what
would be the case if he overtly favored, desired, or intended the killing.
Accordingly, the present theory can say that Pete is less complicit in the
killing than he would be had he provided the same aid to Thomas while
desiring or intending that the killing take place.

110. Note that not all of this can be chalked up to the idea that Pete causally contributed to the
killing less than Thomas did. After all, Pete’s assistance is substantial, allowing Thomas to take
advantage of the flaw in the security system and decreasing his chances of getting caught.
111. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text; see also infra note 126.
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C. Evidence of Condoning and the Traditional Mens Rea Categories
One might wonder how the mental state singled out by this theory—
unjustifiable condoning—relates to the traditional categories of the
criminal law: namely, purpose (or intent), knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence. These four mental states make up the familiar “culpability
hierarchy,”112 in which a bit of misconduct performed with a mental
state located higher on the hierarchy is thought to be more culpable than
the same misconduct performed with the mental state that falls lower on
the hierarchy.113
According to the theory proposed here, which of these traditional
mental states the putative accomplice acted with is best seen as a source
of defeasible evidence about whether the true mens rea for complicity is
present.114 If a putative accomplice acted with a mental state that is
higher up on the culpability hierarchy, then (all else equal) his acts of
assistance likely will manifest a greater degree of condoning the
underlying crime—i.e., a greater failure to be repelled by the crime.
Consider, first, the difference between purpose and knowledge.
Acting with the purpose that the underlying crime be committed will
generally display a greater failure to be repelled by the crime than
merely aiding it knowingly would. Aiding with the purpose that the
crime be committed involves some overt motivational attraction to the
crime (a pro-attitude).115 By contrast, aiding with mere knowledge of
112. See, e.g., Dannye Holley, Culpability Evaluations in the State Supreme Courts from 1977
to 1999: A “Model” Assessment, 34 AKRON L. REV. 401, 410 (2001) (assessing how far states
have gone in adopting the “Model Penal Code culpability definitions and its hierarchical
interrelationship”); Simons, supra note 43, at 464 (discussing “the hierarchical ordering of states
of mind in contemporary law”).
113. To the four core mental states just mentioned, we might also add willful blindness (which
tends to fit in the hierarchy somewhere between knowledge and recklessness), extreme
recklessness (to be placed in a similar spot) and gross negligence (to be placed between
recklessness and simple negligence). See Alex Sarch, Willful Ignorance, Culpability and the
Criminal Law, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1023 (2014) (discussing conditions under which willfully
ignorant misconduct is as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.2(b) (1985) (noting that “criminal homicide constitutes murder when . . . it is committed
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”
(emphasis added)); Pennsylvania v. Lobiondo, 501 Pa. 599 (1983) (distinguishing negligence
from gross negligence).
114. In this respect, my account resembles a view of Gideon Yaffe’s according to which the
“point of mens rea” is to provide evidence about whether one’s modes of recognition and
response to reasons is faulty—i.e., one’s degree of culpability. See Gideon Yaffe, The Point of
Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance (Nov. 26, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
115. This view is widespread. Michael Bratman argues that intending an effect entails being
committed to it in at least three ways, while merely foreseeing the effect does not. In particular,
when one intends an effect, one is disposed to 1) “engage in appropriate means-end reasoning”
about how to bring about the effect, 2) rely on this intention to “constrain [one’s] other
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the crime, but no purpose or other pro-attitude toward it, shows at best
that one’s motivational aversion to crime is insufficiently strong, such
that one is willing to abide or tolerate the performance of the crime.116
But a positive attraction to an event is generally going to involve a
greater failure to be repelled by it than a mere willingness to tolerate
that event.117
A related point applies as between recklessness and knowledge,118 as

intentions,” and 3) “make adjustments in what one is doing in response to indications of one’s
success or failure in promoting” the intended effect. MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS,
AND PRACTICAL REASON 141 (1999); see also Allison Hills, Defending Double Effect, 116 PHIL.
STUD. 133, 134 (2003) (observing that an agent who intends an effect “aim[s] at it” or “tries to
achieve it”; “an agent intends some state of affairs if she is committed to bringing it about”).
116. Bratman and Hills claim that this pro-attitude or commitment to effects that are intended
is not present when the effect is merely a foreseen side effect of one’s conduct. See BRATMAN,
supra note 115, at 142 (claiming that when one does not intend the effect, but merely foresees it,
one’s “attitude toward . . . [the effect] will not play a similar trio of roles”); Hills, supra note 115,
at 134 (“[A]n agent merely foresees bringing about some state of affairs if she is aware that she
will bring it about, but she does not aim at it, try to achieve it, choose actions on the basis of
whether they contribute to achieving it, or monitor her success at achieving it.”).
117. This requires qualification. In principle, it is possible that someone could intend the
underlying crime and thus, feel a motivational attraction to it, but nonetheless be more repelled by
the crime than a merely knowing aider. For example, contrast a good-hearted but naïve
intentional accomplice, A, with a callous but merely knowing accomplice, B. Suppose A is
strongly repelled by the crime (she is shocked and disgusted by it), but believes that the benefits
of its success slightly outweigh the harmfulness of the crime. Accordingly, A aids the crime with
the purpose that it succeed. Now consider B, who has no real interest in or pro-attitude toward
the success of crime, but decides to aid the crime out of sheer indifference to it. B is not repelled
by the crime whatsoever, but also is not particularly attracted to it. Accordingly, B aids the crime
only knowingly—with no overt desire for, or commitment to, its success. B seems more
insufficiently repelled by the crime than A is. After all, A is highly repelled by it—nearly as
repelled as a normal law-abiding person would be. Accordingly, my argument in the main text
might seem problematic.
Nonetheless, as I have argued elsewhere, this complication does not completely undermine
the familiar culpability hierarchy. The sense in which purposeful misconduct is worse than
merely knowing misconduct simply must be formulated with greater precision. In particular,
there is a sense in which being committed to promoting the success of the crime (or more
generally causing harm) displays a distinctive form of culpability that is not present in merely
knowing misconduct (where no such commitment is present). This is the distinctive culpability
in wrongly taking there to be reasons in favor of the crime (or harm)—that is, being overly
attracted to the crime (or harm). Nonetheless, this distinctive culpability can, in some cases, be
outweighed by other sources of culpability displayed by the merely knowing wrongdoer (e.g., the
meager benefits aimed at when acting). Thus, purposeful misconduct is only pro tanto more
culpable than merely knowing misconduct. But if all the morally salient factors are held equal, I
argue, then purposeful misconduct is on balance more culpable than merely knowing misconduct.
For a full elaboration of this argument, see Alex Sarch, Double Effect and the Criminal Law
Culpability Hierarchy, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2015).
118. As noted above, knowledge in the criminal law is not justified true belief plus some antiGettier condition, but rather just the conjunction of high subjective credence (practical certainty)
and truth. See supra note 40.
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other theorists have also noted.119 In particular, one seems to more
strongly condone the underlying crime if one aided it knowing that the
principal would do the crime than if one was merely reckless about the
matter (i.e., believed there was a substantial chance the underlying
crime would be committed). This is because acting with knowledge
(practical certainty) that one is aiding a bad action tends to show a
greater failure to be repelled by it than providing the same aid while
merely seeing it as fairly likely that one is helping the criminal
action.120 121
The result is the same for recklessly aiding a crime as opposed to
negligently doing so. The former involves consciously disregarding a
risk that one is aiding the underlying crime, while the latter involves not
conscious disregard of the risk, but merely failing to recognize it when
119. See Simons, supra note 45, at 16 (arguing that a knowing wrongdoer’s “action reveals
willingness to tolerate a greater harm or evil in pursuit of his ends” than the action of a merely
reckless wrongdoer).
120. This follows from a principle I have elsewhere dubbed “the principle of comparative
culpability.” According to this principle,
[f]or any two people who commit the actus reus of a crime, if they are identical in all
respects except that one is more confident in the truth of the inculpatory proposition, P,
than the other, then—assuming there are no relevant excuses or justifications, and all
else is equal—the person with the greater degree of confidence in P is more culpable
than the one with the lesser degree of confidence.
See Sarch, supra note 113, at 1062–63 (footnote omitted).
121. One might object that this claim would not hold if the actor thought there were justifying
reasons in favor of the underlying crime. In that case, the actor might indeed be strongly repelled
by the crime, but the motivational force he feels against it is outweighed by the strength of the
apparent justifying reasons in its favor. For example, A might be sufficiently repelled by B’s
putatively criminal conduct, but A is nonetheless motivated to aid B because A believes there are
other considerations that justify B’s conduct. In this case, A’s knowingly aiding B might not
demonstrate more insufficient repulsion to B’s crime than someone who recklessly aids a similar
crime but does not think there are any reasons that justify the crime.
However, it is doubtful that the criminal law would recognize such a state of affairs. First of
all, note that the sort of counterexample just sketched cannot arise if the underlying crime aided
itself is a knowledge or intent crime. After all, the criminal law does not recognize that there are
any justifying reasons for knowledge or intent crimes outside of the formal defenses of necessity,
self-defense, and so on. See Simons, supra note 43 at 474–75. Thus, according to criminal law
doctrine, there cannot be a situation in which the primary actor is guilty of a knowledge or intent
crime, but nonetheless is justified by something outside the affirmative defenses like necessity or
self-defense (which would defeat his guilt). As a result, if the putative accomplice really does aid
something that is a knowledge or intent crime, then he cannot be sufficiently repelled by it and, at
the same time, correctly believe that the crime is justified by some other considerations.
By contrast, recklessness crimes have the possibility of justifying reasons built in. After all,
being reckless requires being aware of an unjustified risk. But if the risk that the primary actor is
aware of is justified, then he would not qualify as reckless! As a result, there would be no crime
there for the putative accomplice to aid. Accordingly, the putative accomplice would not have
been insufficiently repelled by the primary actor’s conduct. He would not be insufficiently
repelled by it because it is not criminal. Accordingly, the amount of repulsion he feels toward it
would be entirely adequate, even if he aids that conduct.
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one should have.122 Thus, recklessness toward the underlying crime
would typically show a greater failure to be repelled by the crime than
negligence toward it would.
Thus, on the present account, determining which of the traditional
mens rea a putative accomplice possessed while aiding the underlying
crime is evidence of the degree to which he possessed the true mens rea
for complicity—i.e., that of condoning the crime. If so, this would help
explain the intractable disagreement concerning what mens rea is
required for complicity. The discussion to this point has largely
presupposed that it will ultimately be one of the traditional mens rea
categories (e.g., purpose or knowledge or recklessness), or some
combination of these, that should be required for complicity. However,
if the present account is correct—such that the traditional mens rea one
acted with just is evidence of the degree to which one possesses the true
mens rea for complicity—then we would have been searching in vain
for one traditional mens rea (or a combination of them) that always
delivered plausible results about particular cases. Accordingly, the
present account highlights a flawed assumption inherent in the debate
about the correct mens rea for complicity, as it has, by and large,
proceeded to this point.123 Explicitly rejecting this assumption should
help make progress on a question that, hitherto, has proved intractable.
In addition, the question of which traditional mens rea one acted with
is not the only source of available evidence when it comes to
determining the extent to which one condoned the underlying crime. A
second source of evidence about whether the defendant possessed the
true mens rea for complicity is the amount of causal contribution that
he intended or expected to make to the success of the crime.124 After

122. The Model Penal Code defines recklessness such that “[a] person acts recklessly with
respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(c) (1985). By contrast, a “person acts negligently with respect to a material element
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct.” Id. § 2.02(d).
123. Not all theorists writing on complicity make this assumption. Yaffe is one notable
example of a legal scholar who does not endorse a traditional mens rea category as the mental
state required for complicity. See Yaffe, supra note 37, at 13–25.
124. We might make the notion more precise as follows:
Projected Causal Contribution: Defendant, D’s, projected causal contribution to the
wrongdoing, W, of another is greater:
a) the more actual causal contribution to W that D expects (believes), when acting,
that he will make to W; or if no amount is expected when acting, then
b) the more such contribution D contemplates when deliberating about how to act
beforehand; or if no amount is expected or contemplated, then
c) the more such contribution that is reasonably foreseeable to D based on his
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all, it seems that, as a general matter, the greater the causal contribution
one believes one’s actions will make to the underlying crime (however
such contributions are to be understood—e.g., as raising the probability
of the success of the crime, or as lessening the burdens of doing it), the
more one manifests one’s failure to be sufficiently repelled by the
crime. Of course, this is just a generalization, since the amount of
causal contribution one can make depends not just on how attracted or
repelled one is by the prospect of the crime, but also on what options for
aiding the crime are practically available. Nonetheless, it seems that the
degree of expected causal contribution to the crime can still provide
valuable (if defeasible) evidence about the extent to which the putative
accomplice unjustifiably condones the underlying crime.
V. IMPLEMENTING THE CONDONING THEORY
Difficult questions remain, however, about how the idealized account
of complicity just presented could be practically implemented in the
criminal law. In this Part, I consider how the theory that unjustifiable
condoning is the mens rea for complicity might be implemented. The
result, I argue, is an account of when and how criminal accomplice
liability should be imposed that is more normatively defensible than the
other accounts discussed. However, to obtain the normative benefits of
the proposed account, reforms to existing complicity law are required.
A. Full vs. Lesser Complicity
One of the main benefits of taking condoning the crime to be the
mens rea for complicity is that it straightforwardly makes room for
different degrees of complicity. To preserve the normative advantages
of this idea, the criminal law, too, should recognize different levels of
accomplice liability. (As explained earlier,125 other legal scholars have
made similar suggestions, at least as far as the defendant’s causal
contribution to the crime is concerned.126) To keep the proposal as

evidence prior to acting.
125. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.
126. The idea of reforming the criminal law to recognize degrees of complicity is not novel.
However, the existing proposals in this vein focus on recognizing that one can make different
levels of causal contribution to the underlying crime, whereas my proposal involves recognizing
that the mens rea of complicity can come in degrees. By way of contrast, Christopher Kutz
argues that “[a] rational law of complicity would recognize [the differing culpability levels of
participants in criminal activities], by mitigating the accountability of [minimal] accomplices and
aggravating that of instigators.” KUTZ, supra note 15, at 233. In a similar vein, Dressler
forcefully argues that “American accomplice law is a disgrace. It treats the accomplice in terms
of guilt and, potentially, punishment, as if she were the perpetrator, even when her culpability is
often less than that of the perpetrator and/or her involvement in the crime is tangential.” Dressler,
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simple and practical as possible, the framework I endorse carves out
only two levels of complicity: full complicity and lesser complicity.
Which category a given defendant belongs in will depend on the degree
to which he unjustifiably condones the underlying crime. A precise
account of this distinction will be provided in a moment.
One looming question that should be addressed first, however, is
what the penalties associated with these two categories of complicity
should be. Again, with an eye to keeping the framework as practical as
possible, I suggest that only a full accomplice should be punishable as a
principal—i.e., may be convicted of the same underlying crime that the
principal has committed. By contrast, a lesser accomplice should not be
punished as a principal, but should be convicted of a distinct offense—
namely, the crime of being a lesser accomplice to the underlying
offense. And this new crime should be taken to carry a lesser penalty
than the underlying offense. This could be accomplished, to start with,
by a statutory reform exempting the lesser accomplice from any
mandatory minimums associated with the underlying crime.127
Moreover, an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
should recognize a reduction to the offense level for the underlying
crime based on the comparatively low degree to which a lesser
accomplice condones the underlying crime.128 This proposal seems
especially feasible, given that the Guidelines already include a reduction
for the defendant’s so-called “mitigating role,” which subtracts between
two and four points from the defendant’s offense level if she was either
a “minor” or “minimal” participant.129 However, while this existing
reduction applies to cases involving a minor causal contribution to the
crime, my proposal is to allow the lesser accomplice’s offense level to
be reduced based on her less culpable mens rea—i.e., the relatively
small extent to which she condones the crime. In other words, the
supra note 10, at 427. I think Kutz’s and Dressler’s proposals are well taken and my view that
the mens rea of complicity comes in degrees is compatible with their views. See also Weiss
supra note 2, at 1487-88; Moore, supra note 14, at 451-52.
127. Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
199, 199–200 (1993) (arguing that “[a]t long last, the time may be ripe for congressional
reexamination of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes” and claiming that there is “good
reason to believe that in their overall effects, mandatories are not only unfair but also powerfully
counterproductive”).
128. For some general explanation of how the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines function, see, for
example, BRADFORD BOGAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL SENTENCING 9–19 (14th ed.
2012).
129. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011)
(“(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. (b)
If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. In cases
falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels.”).
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proposal is to recognize an offense level reduction for “minor
endorsement.”
What, then, do the categories of full and lesser complicity involve,
more precisely? As seen in discussing the problems with the derivative
approach, we want to avoid the result that the accomplice is punished as
a principal despite being significantly less culpable than the principal
wrongdoer. We can accomplish this by taking it that one is a full
accomplice when one counts as complicit in the underlying crime and is
approximately as culpable as a principal. By contrast, one is a lesser
accomplice when one counts as complicit in the underlying crime, but is
substantially less culpable than a principal.
Of course, making such culpability judgments directly is an
extremely fact-sensitive and difficult task. Accordingly, a more
workable test is needed for determining when an accomplice is as
culpable as the principal wrongdoer—i.e., whether he is a full or a lesser
accomplice. My proposal, which draws loosely on the agency
approach, is that we look to see whether the putative accomplice’s
failure to be repelled by the underlying crime is so great that he would
have authorized the crime, if he were in a position to make that sort of
determination. More precisely, the proposed test is this:
Authorization Test: For a putative accomplice, D, and primary
wrongdoer, P, D condones P’s crime, C, strongly enough to make D
count as a full accomplice to C if D’s failure to be motivationally
repelled by C is so great that, if D were in a position of power or
authority over P prior to P’s conduct, D would authorize or allow P’s
commission of C (or at least each relevant element of the offense).

Although I do not claim this to be a perfect test,130 as a general rule,
those putative accomplices who satisfy the Authorization Test are
unlikely to be substantially less culpable than the principal wrongdoer.
The reason is that if one’s actual attitude toward the crime is such that
one would authorize the crime ex ante were one in a position to decide
whether or not it will be committed, then one’s level of indifference to,
or failure to be repelled by, the crime approximates the level possessed
by someone who performs the crime himself. This, in turn, has
130. In particular, one might worry that this test would allow us to impose accomplice liability
merely on the basis of how the defendant would have acted under counterfactual circumstances
(akin to punishing merely for character) rather than on the basis of how he actually behaved. Cf.
Sarch, supra note 105 (manuscript at 22–33) (devoting Part III to discussing related worries about
a prominent theory of another criminal law doctrine). Nonetheless, the Authorization Test is put
forward merely as an evidentiary heuristic that courts can straightforwardly employ in real cases.
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implications about culpability. After all, one’s culpability for an action
is plausibly understood as being a function of the extent to which the
action manifests one’s insufficient regard for the legitimate interests of
others (i.e., one’s failure to properly respond to the reasons against
doing the action).131 Accordingly, a putative accomplice who condones
the underlying crime strongly enough to satisfy the Authorization Test
is typically going to be approximately as culpable for his conduct as the
principal wrongdoer is for the underlying crime. This test, although
imperfect, should help focus the judicial decision maker’s inquiry into
whether someone who aided and condoned the underlying crime
somewhat is to count as a full accomplice or a lesser accomplice.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Framework
Taken together, these proposals yield an account of when and how
accomplice liability should be imposed by the criminal law. The
theoretical basis for the account is the idea that the mens rea for
complicity is the mental state of condoning the underlying crime. And
the fact that one can condone a crime to greater or lesser degrees is
captured by distinguishing between full and lesser complicity, with their
differing levels of punishment.
As I will now argue, this account largely avoids the difficulties with
the other views of complicity discussed above. For one thing, it avoids
the difficulty faced by the derivative approach. That approach, recall,
allowed for accomplice liability—full stop—to be imposed even on
defendants who were significantly less culpable than the principal. The
account proposed here, however, provides a systematic way to impose
some, but not full, liability on lesser accomplices who are not as
culpable as principals who perform the underlying crime directly. For
this reason, the framework has plausible implications about the case of
Pete (discussed above). Pete—in both versions of the case132—
condones the crime somewhat, but likely not enough to make him as
culpable as Thomas. Thus, on the present account, Pete is not a full
131. See, e.g., NOMY ARPALY & TIM SCHROEDER, IN PRAISE OF DESIRE 170 (2014) (“[A]
person is blameworthy for a wrong action, A, to the extent that A manifests ill will (or moral
indifference) through being rationalized by it.”). This theory is also roughly equivalent to the
theory that an action is culpable to the degree that it displays the actor’s faulty modes of
recognition and response to reasons. GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 38 (2010) (discussing the theory that conduct deserves censure
(or blame) if and only if “it is a product of a faulty mode of recognition or response to reasons for
action”); see also Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal
Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 931, 938 (2000) (endorsing an insufficient regard theory of
culpability).
132. See supra Parts III.A, III.B and accompanying text.
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accomplice, but rather a lesser accomplice who receives a reduced
punishment proportionate to his relatively lower degree of culpability.
Similarly, the father who recklessly lends his keys to his joyrideloving son would also be only a lesser accomplice.133 After all, the
father seems substantially less culpable for the death his son caused
because the father did not very strongly condone that crime. Although
the father failed to be sufficiently repelled by the son’s reckless joyride,
this failure was not so great that he would authorize the son’s
misconduct ex ante. So the father fails the Authorization Test.
By contrast, the getaway driver who knows his passengers will rob a
bank and has a financial stake in the crime because he is to be paid from
the proceeds of the heist might well count as a full accomplice.134 His
knowledge and stake in the crime, together with the substantial causal
contribution he expects to make, provide good (if fallible) evidence that
he would authorize the heist ex ante, were he in a position to make that
call.135 However, if the driver only believed there was a substantial risk
that his passengers would rob the bank, it is less obvious that he would
authorize the robbery ex ante. Accordingly, the reckless getaway driver
might count only as a lesser accomplice.
What, then, about the borderline case of donating money to the
panhandler knowing it will be used on drugs?136 If the benefactor
genuinely knows (not merely suspects or thinks there is a risk) that the
panhandler will use the money to buy drugs, and supposing the
benefactor realizes that his causal contribution to the crime is
substantial, then it is plausible that the benefactor unjustifiably
condones the drug buy. He fails to be sufficiently motivationally
repelled by what the law views as the bad-making features of drug buys.
Thus, some sort of accomplice liability would be appropriate. However,
whether the benefactor is to be deemed a full accomplice or a lesser
accomplice depends on whether he in fact condones the drug buy so
much that he would authorize the drug buy ex ante, were he in a
133. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
135. This case might seem to be similar in some ways to that of Pete. However, there are at
least two significant differences. First, even though Pete also is aware that Thomas will commit
the murder, we know conclusively that Pete does not condone the murder and would not
authorize it ex ante. Second, while the getaway car driver sees his contribution as a but-for cause
for the success of the bank robbery, Pete reasonably believes that his aid is not a but-for cause of
Thomas’s murder. After all, Pete is well aware that Thomas will accomplish the crime with or
without his help. Given these two differences, I think it is plausible that the getaway car driver
could be a full accomplice, while Pete (as explained in Part III.B) would only be properly
considered a lesser accomplice.
136. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
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position to decide whether it would take place.
Similar considerations apply to the statistical version of the
benefactor case. It is clear that this benefactor would not authorize any
drug buys ex ante, and so full accomplice liability is unwarranted. If
complicity were taken to be an on-off affair, then no accomplice
liability would seem appropriate. But if degrees of complicity are
recognized, as I argue they should be, then perhaps the benefactor in the
statistical case should be taken to be a lesser accomplice. On the other
hand, if one thinks no accomplice liability is appropriate here, then one
can get this result by asserting that the amount of repulsion to the drug
buys the benefactor manifested was not insufficient.
The case of the gas station attendant who pumps gas for the bank
robbers,137 knowing what they intend to do, likely would not count as
an accomplice (though for slightly different reasons). Although the gas
station attendant has the mens rea of knowledge toward the bank
robbery, the amount of causal contribution he expects to make to the
success of the crime is small. He recognizes that he is not a but-for
cause of the robbery, since the robbers could simply drive on to another
gas station—though this would slow them down and raise their chances
of getting caught. Thus, he expects to make only a small contribution to
the crime.138 As a result, it is doubtful that he was insufficiently
repelled by the crime—i.e., that he unjustifiably condoned it.
Nonetheless, if one thinks that his conduct shows him to have condoned
the bank robbery to an unjustifiable extent, then one could still count
him a lesser accomplice. (Full accomplice liability is ruled out because
it is clear that he does not desire the crime and would not authorize its
commission ex ante.)
One final benefit of the present account is that (unlike the objective
endorsement view) it makes room for the possibility that ignorance of
the law can impact a putative accomplice’s liability for the underlying
crime. In particular, if you act to aid the conduct of another, but
reasonably fail to realize that it is wrong or criminal, then this can
mitigate the extent to which your actions show that you are
insufficiently repelled by the underlying crime. If there is a good
explanation for why you failed to realize that the conduct you aided is
criminal (e.g., because the law in question dealt with highly technical
matters and you are a layperson), then this can defeat the inference that

137. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
138. Matters would be different if the gas station were the only one for miles, and the robbers
were out of gas. Though in that case, if the attendant reasonably feared for his safety, he might
have a duress defense for his conduct.
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you unjustifiably condoned a crime.
C. Concluding Remarks
Given that the account developed here has plausible implications
about all the issues discussed above, there is a great deal counting in its
favor. It has the resources to plausibly explain a range of hard cases
that complicity doctrine has traditionally struggled to address in a
principled fashion. More work would be needed to fully spell out the
details of the present account and to determine the best way to
implement it practically. But enough should hopefully have been said
to justify pursuing the matter further.
One might protest that my account does not really provide a solution
to the question we began with: namely, which of the traditional mens
rea categories should be required with respect to the underlying crime in
order to be an accomplice. However, rather than privileging one or
several of the familiar mens rea categories, my account seeks to show
why the traditional mens rea categories, by themselves, do not
sufficiently explain the mental state involved in complicity. In
recognizing that the mens rea for complicity comes in degrees, the
account defended here shows that theorists have been trying in vain to
formulate a rule concerning the mens rea for complicity in terms of the
traditional mens rea categories. Rather, my account reveals that
different traditional mens rea can suffice in different cases because it is
possible for the putative accomplice to unjustifiably condone the
underlying crime to different degrees.
What is more, my account helps to drive home the need to reform the
law of complicity. While others have argued that aiders who make only
a minor causal contribution to the underlying crime should not be
punished as harshly as principals,139 my account shows that a
distinction between full and lesser complicity is called for on
independent mens rea grounds. Because one can condone the
underlying crime to different degrees, and because this has a direct
impact on the extent of one’s culpability for aiding the crime, the law
should not automatically punish aiders who only weakly condone the
crime as harshly as principals. To punish such lesser accomplices as
harshly as principals, despite their being substantially less culpable than
principals, would be to commit a grave injustice. Recognizing that the
mens rea for complicity comes in degrees thus serves to highlight the
injustice that exists under the current legal regime, and shows the way
to avoiding this injustice in the future.
139. See supra notes 10–15, 126–129 and accompanying text.

